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
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ANTI-SCEPTICISM ;
OR,
AN INQUIRY
INTO
THE NATURE AND PHILOSOPHY
OF
LANGUAGE,
AS CONNECTED WITH
The Sacred Scriptures.

BY
JAMES WRIGHT,
LATE OF MAGDALEN HALL, OXFORD;
AUTHOR OF "THE SCHOOL ORATOR," "THE PHILOSOPHY OF ELOCUTION,"
"READINGS OF THE LITURGY," &c.


It is to be remembered that connexion is not identity.

Remarks on Scepticism.

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SECOND EDITION.

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1827.

PREFACE.

AMONG all the inquiries which are presented to the student, there are few so well calculated to call forth his energies as some of the elementary questions respecting language. Those particularly concerning articulate voices in contradistinction to instinctive signs, the nature of the substantive and the verb, the use of the various parts of speech, universal grammar, and the diversity of tongues,—are topics which excite in the mind of the intellectual student an especial interest.

The Author has endeavoured to explain the significations of the substantive and the verb by the use of particular and general arguments,—all tending to assert the being and attributes of a First Cause, and to oppose the popular doctrines of atheistical and sceptical philosophy.

What he has advanced concerning the writings of Locke, and his controversy with the Bishop of Worcester, is offered with exceeding diffidence.

The arguments respecting the primitive language are deduced entirely from the sacred writings, and the greater part of the notes illustrative of the text are sanctioned by the authorities of D'Oyly and Mant.

As the writer of a recent work has affirmed, that the *verb* is the primitive part of speech, and that every sentence is a *factitious word*, it may be here noticed, that a few hints on the same subjects, but espousing contrary doctrines, will be found in the following pages. The Author conceives it hardly requisite to mention, that the remarks on sceptical philosophy have no reference whatever to the above writer.

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ANTI-SCEPTICISM;

OR,

An INQUIRY into the NATURE and PHILOSOPHY of LANGUAGE, as connected with the SACRED SCRIPTURES.

CHAP. I.—SEC. I.

Notices in the Scriptures respecting certain facts, as pertaining to the arts and sciences—their differences—the ends which they are calculated to promote—object of the following Treatise—to discourse on the Nature and Philosophy of Language, as connected with the Sacred Scriptures—author of the “*Diversions of Purley*”—the noun—verb, and its “peculiar differential circumstance,” &c.—the philosophy of Horne Tooke not favourable to the inquiry respecting the verb—destruction of the MSS. of Horne Tooke, and the probable conclusion to be drawn from the circumstance—the opinions of other writers respecting the primitive part of speech—the object of the present Treatise more fully stated, and the plan for pursuing the inquiry laid down.

ALL the circumstances and relations, which are incidentally mentioned in the sacred records respecting contemporary manners and the arts and sciences, are, unquestionably, calculated to assist and strengthen the intellectual energies of man. But the intimations and relations which we find in those sacred stores are of a two-fold nature. They are divisible into those which are essential to the necessities and comforts of man in this lower world, and into those which have reference more particularly to his being and happiness in that which is to come. The former may be viewed as so many relations of facts, which were addressed immediately to the external senses at the time those facts are recorded to have taken place; and this knowledge, the sound philosopher believes could not, at so early a period of the creation,

have been acquired by unassisted reason. Such, among others, are the relations respecting language, husbandry, the reduction of metals, and metallurgic science: while the latter, viz. those intimations which concern the happiness of man in a future state, were designed more peculiarly to stimulate the nobler faculties of the mind, and were further intended for reproof and for instruction; such are the intimations in Genesis, Joshua, Isaiah, &c. respecting the sun,* and the token of the

* *Sam stand thou still, &c. Josh. x. 12.* It is remarkable, that the terms in which this event is recorded in the sacred writings, do not agree with what is now known concerning the motions of the heavenly bodies; for whereas it is recorded, that the sun and moon were made to stop for a whole day, it is now sufficiently known that day and night are not caused by any motion of the sun, but by the rotation of the earth on its own axis. It should be remembered, however, that as in those early ages men had not the slightest notion of the modern discoveries in astronomy, it was unavoidably necessary that the event should be described according to the knowledge then obtained. If God had dictated to Joshua to record the miracle in terms suitable to the modern discoveries in astronomy, Joshua would have appeared to express it in a manner directly contrary to all the rules of science then known: and his account of what had happened would have been objected to as false in astronomy. It would have appeared rather a wild fancy, or a gross blunder of his own, than a true account of a real miracle; and so would have been received with little attention by the persons for whom it was written. Thus when God directed Joshua to record this miracle, he did not direct him to record it in a manner more agreeable to true astronomy; because if he had done so, unless he inspired the world at the same time with a true knowledge of astronomy, the account would rather have tended to raise amongst those who read it and heard of it, disputes and "oppositions of sciences falsely so called," than have promoted the great ends of religion intended by it.—Dr. SHUCKROD, *D'Oyley and Mant's Bible*.

It has been observed that the Hebrew word (*וַיָּעַבְדוּ*) does not signify the sun, but the solar light; thus God's light, at the desire of Joshua, have so increased the refractive power of the atmosphere, that the light of the sun was observed long after the regular setting of that luminary; in other words, the solar light remained on the earth, or figuratively "the sun stand still." God, by staying the departure of the

covenant of Almighty God after the flood, the rainbow;* recitals plainly conforming to the opinions and notions of the patriarchal ages: and such, likewise, are all the exact and perfect declarations respecting true philosophy and metaphysical science; exhibiting to our minds the present weakness of our capacities, and offering to us constant lessons of humility; exciting in us feelings of industry to improve our knowledge and enlarge our faculties, and finally, tending to fortify our minds against the violation of scepticism on the one hand, and spiritual pride on the other. Abstractedly considered, such, doubtless, is the two-fold meaning of all the scientific circumstances and intimations, illustrative of the opinions of the times, which are to be met with in Scripture; and which, to the highest degree, are interesting to students of every branch of sound, unsophisticated philosophy. Considered in a religious point of view, those relations are intimately connected with the internal evidences of the Bible.

The object of the following Treatise is to discourse on one branch of science; the Nature and Philosophy of Language, as connected with the Sacred Scriptures. During the inquiry, it shall be my endeavour to show, in opposition to sceptical philosophy, that the substantive, and not the verb, is the primitive part of speech;

sun's light, exposed to the Hebrews the Philistines' folly in attributing omnipotence to a body which could be arrested at the pleasure of a superior power.—*Encyclopædia Metropolitana.*

* It is not at all necessary to inquire whether there was or was not any rainbow before the flood. Upon either supposition the Divine Wisdom is very apparent, in appointing the rainbow for a token of his covenant and a memorial of his promise, that as often as men should see it, they might remember, that God had given them such a promise, and that his infallible word should be their sufficient security.—Dr. WATERLAND, *D'Ody and Mant's Bible.*

and, consequently, that it is that into which every one of the rest is more easily to be resolved: "And Adam gave names to all cattle, and to the fowl of the air, and to every beast of the field."

In my attempt to unfold the office and character of the verb, I shall endeavour to expose some of the principles and doctrines of Materialism, Atheistical and Sceptical Philosophy, and to offer one or two remarks on the nature of the passions. To this I shall add a few suggestions respecting grammar; a few hints concerning the formation of sentences, as connected with the state and progress of thought; and, finally, in conjunction with arguments deduced from the sacred authority of Scripture, an inquiry relating to the primitive language, the changes and diversity of tongues.

CHAP: I.—SEC. II.

It is singular, that the author of the "Diversions of Purley," should have traced every part of speech to its original source, and in the structure of language marked the precise boundaries of each, and yet that he should have affirmed the verb to be something more than the noun: so that while he separated the rest of the parts of speech from their root, he suffered the verb to remain in quiet possession of the "peculiar differential circumstance" which he conceived it to inherit over and above the noun, the primitive part of speech or root. Preparatory to his Philological Diversions, had Horne Tooke permitted himself to investigate the natural progress of his own thoughts, had he derived his philosophy from its true and genuine source, had his mind been engaged

in subjects connected with himself, his fellow beings, and his God, the true, the only philosophical *root* and *cause* of *all things*,—had this been the order of the study of Horne Tooke, no man, whose philosophy and metaphysics are sound, will deny that there would have been a greater probability of the philologist's success in assigning to the verb what he termed "its peculiar differential circumstance:" he would probably have been enabled to assign to the verb its proper station in common with the rest of the parts of speech, and thus have separated it from its root.

It appears, however, clear, that the philosophy of Horne Tooke was not so humiliating to his species as that of some of his contemporaries, and others who have survived him. But in point of talent, it is almost a profanation of every sort of justice to compare this individual with any of those persons who held the same doctrines in common with himself. While, therefore, it is to be acknowledged, that the author of the *Diversions of Purley* was avowedly a friend to all the wild and destructive schemes of liberty which have since continued to poison and infest the minds of the ignorant, the wretched, and the depraved, still I contend, that the principles of Horne Tooke were not so degrading to human nature as those of certain of his contemporaries. Whatever may have been his notions of Revealed Religion, and however he may have promulgated them amongst the circle of his acquaintance,—as far as the individual circumstance extends of his not having in writing transmitted heretical opinions, thus far, I say, his reputation is not "damned to everlasting fame." In attributing to the noun the right of being called the primitive part of speech, he necessarily acknowledged the

declaration of the sacred writings on this point to be correct. I am not qualified to affirm, that he was pleased at this coincidence, or as some have supposed; that he was led to, and was strengthened in the opinion from a consideration of the controversy between the Bishop of Worcester and Locke, respecting innate ideas! For my own part, I cannot see what connexion subsists between the doctrines respecting innate ideas; and the question concerning the primitive part of speech. Horne Tooke was of opinion, that the noun was the primitive root of all the other parts of speech: and this opinion is undoubtedly supported by the authority of the well-known passage in the 2nd chapter of Genesis:—“And Adam gave names to all cattle, and to the fowl of the air, and to every beast of the field.” But independently of this coincidence, as proving that the judgment of Horne Tooke was hardly so degraded as that of his party, we have tolerably good grounds for hoping, that feelings of conviction struck the mind of this philosopher during the latter period of his life: when he was led to burn his manuscript writings, and communicate to his friend, that “he was preparing for a long journey.”*

* About a fortnight before the death of Horne Tooke, Mr. Whitwell, the architect, informed me of his friend's calling upon the author of *Εἰς Ἠρεσίν*, when he found him busily employed in burning his manuscript writings. These writings were of such number and magnitude as to occupy the whole of the morning before they were consumed. Having been asked what he was about,—after a pause of some time, Horne Tooke replied—“I am preparing for a long journey.” “This was accompanied with a manner so deeply impressive, that I shall never forget it,” said the friend of Mr. Whitwell: he stated, that several times during his stay he was obliged to retreat from the fire-place, in consequence of the heat which the blaze of the papers occasioned, and that the eye of Horne Tooke was alternately riveted on them and him, anxiously waiting the destruction of the writings, and seemingly fearful lest his friend should secrete any of them. It is supposed, that

But if it be considered strange for Horne Tooke to have affirmed, that verbs, as well as the other parts of speech, are nouns, and that a verb is something more than a noun; and that the title of verb was given to it on account of that distinguishing something more than mere nouns convey,—it seems, to me, at least, equally strange that writers, who cannot be suspected for one moment of being sceptical in their opinions, should have broached theories in order to prove, that the verb, and not the noun, is the primitive or root of all the other parts of speech. It is perfectly unnecessary to enumerate the names of these writers, or to enter minutely into their arguments merely for the sake of confuting them. One of the objects of this Treatise will be secured, by stating my own reasons for believing, that the noun, and not the verb, is the original or primitive root, whence every other part of speech is derived.

For this purpose, and to form an adequate notion of language, and its rise and progress to the grammatical structure of a sentence, it seems requisite to contemplate the nature of man in particular situations; first in his infancy, and secondly in some selected instance of his state in riper years.

CHAP. II.

Faculties and powers of the inferior animals—those of mankind—the progressive state of man—the perceptive faculty of an infant, and that of other animals—their ends essentially different—instinct and intellect—instinctive signs not analogous to language.

THE finger of nature operates on the senses of infants, in common with all animal bodies, by painful or plea-

an unpublished volume of *Æsop Hæpiora*, or "Diversions of Purley," perished in the flames.

urable sensations: and every animal capable of expressing sound, makes known the degree of his sensation by appropriate signs of consonance or dissonance. But the Creator has limited the faculties and powers of the inferior animals: he has attached to them peculiar instincts, by which they are enabled to execute, with exactness and precision, every work allotted to their natures; and a very short period perfects the end of their existence. The state of man is far different; destined for nobler purposes, his form and habits are progressive. Many of the instinctive powers common to other animals, are designedly withheld from him, and the free exercise of those which are intellectual is substituted in their stead. A larger portion of time is, therefore, requisite for the developement of the faculties of man. On his entrance into the world, he is more helpless than other animals: and tears and cries demonstrate both the imbecility of his nature, and the acuteness of his animal feeling. His first sensation is that of pain: but no sooner is he relieved, than he sinks almost into a state of apathy. At this period his being may be called mere animal life: his intellectual existence is but in embryo. Thus almost insensible, and altogether helpless, does he recline, till disease, corporal pain, or the sensations of hunger, again call him to action; when the fond caresses of a watchful parent yield to him nurture and support. If pain be the first sensation of an infant, it is equally true, that the incessant care of a mother will soon create in it even another feeling. While the child is hanging at her breast, ask the mother what her feelings are, what the sensations of her babe:—she will tell you they are those of pleasure and delight. The sympathetic glow of nature reverberates from each content and pleasure: and while the

infant sinks to slumber and repose, the mother breathes her joy, and sings forth hymns of praise.

The remarks of Bishop Butler conduce much to the purpose of this discussion, and are deeply philosophical. "Nature," says this learned prelate, "does in no wise qualify us wholly, much less at once, for a mature state of life. Even maturity of understanding and bodily strength, are not only arrived to gradually, but are also very much owing to the continued exercise of our powers of body and mind from infancy. But if we suppose a person brought into the world with both these in maturity, as far as this is conceivable, he would plainly at first be as unqualified for the human life of mature age as an idiot. He would be in a manner distracted with astonishment, and apprehension, and curiosity, and suspense; nor can one guess how long it would be before he would be familiarised to himself and the objects about him enough, even to set himself to any thing. It may be questioned too, whether the natural information of his sight and hearing, would be of any manner of use at all to him in acting, before experience. And it seems, that men would be strangely headstrong and self-willed, and disposed to exert themselves with an impetuosity, which would render society insupportable, and the living in it unpracticable, were it not for some acquired moderation and self-government, some aptitude and readiness in restraining themselves, and concealing their sense of things. Want of every thing of this kind which is learnt, would render a man as incapable of society, as want of language would: or as his natural ignorance of any of the particular employments of life, would render him incapable of providing himself with the common conveniences, or supplying the necessary wants of it. In these

respects, and probably in many more, of which we have no particular notion, mankind is left by nature an unformed, unfinished creature; utterly deficient and unqualified, before the acquirement of knowledge, experience, and habits, for that mature state of life which was the end of his creation, considering him as only related to this world."*

It is very certain that according to the accounts of nurses, and those concerned in the management of children, an infant does not, as it is termed, "begin to take notice," until after the age of four or five weeks; and the first objects which he perceives are his own hands. From that period, provided the infant continue in health, the mental faculties of perceiving, thinking, reasoning, knowing, and every other faculty connected with the powers of reflexion, are uniformly progressive. The first of these faculties, viz. perception, upon which the other faculties depend, seems, therefore, to remain for a considerable time in a state of quiescence. This is an interesting circumstance, and appears to be, in some degree, connected with the philosophy of speech. The senses are the great originals of all our simple ideas of external objects; and by these the faculties of reflexion are influenced and exerted. By what means body and soul are united, and how, through the medium of the outward organs of sense, the mind receives its impressions, are questions too delicate and abstruse to be comprehended and answered by man. His nature, however prominent in ability, feels itself incompetent to the task; it hesitates, and presently shrinks beneath the inquiry: "better to bless the sun than reason how it shines."† The material

* Bishop Butler's Analogy, part 1, chap. 5, sec. 3.

† Ford.

and immaterial parts of man, however, are admirably fitted to act occasionally in unison; and in various situations of his being, they are so constructed as to be very much influenced by each other. These are truths self-evident in nature, and they give to science and philosophy an antecedent proposition, by which one may be enabled to reason on the probable cause of the quiescent state of the mind of an infant; and from which the sound philologist may be enabled to draw a reasonable hypothesis concerning the original part of speech, and the philosophy of language. At this early period of their being, the difference between the state of man and that of the inferior creature, is very striking. The perceptive faculty of our species does not manifest itself near so soon as the perceptive faculty of other animals; but the developement of this one faculty in the infant, evinces to my mind, the boundaries of *instinct*, and reveals the *first dawn of intellect and reason*. The immediate and peculiar cares of the dam for her offspring are very soon dismissed, and are at an end. The young is soon enabled to protect and help himself; he feels no actual want, but that which is absolutely requisite for the duration or continuance of himself and species. It is true he sees surrounding objects and is pleased; he plays and frisks before them: but these are altogether distinct from his necessities; they are not in any degree essential to his real happiness. Take away the object of his play and gambol, is he irreconcilable? No:—however suddenly removed, he neither laments, bemoans, nor does he betray the least uneasiness of sensation. The perceptive faculty of the infant leads to a very different end: after a certain period, he begins to notice certain casual objects;—at their approach he feels delight; he soon se-

lects a favourite one; he calls, *Mamma!* and points, and signifies by signs his wish to have it. Its removal creates uneasy feeling: he cries.

The developement of this faculty seems, to me, to be the very beginning of intellect and language. The casual object, which is here described as being presented to the eyes of the child, and exciting in him pleasurable feelings, was not (as the term "*casual*" implies) anticipated by any uneasiness of sensation, it was actually present, as it were, by accident, it instantly gave the pleasure, and its removal instantly caused a sensation of pain and the expression of it. As, therefore, the natures of the inferior animals are stationary, and the faculties of man progressive, it follows, that the signs of sensation in the one will be soon fixed and determined: and the instinctive voices and gestures of man will be modified by the progress which he makes in the right use of his reason and intellect. Thus the various bleating of the sheep is as conversably familiar to his kind, as the pur or the mew is to the species of the domestic cat; and these are fixed and unalterable in their qualities. But the laughing and crying of man, both as to their meaning and expression, undergo distinct modifications. At first, as in the infant, they are symbols of sympathy and social affection. In his early stages, the uneasy sensations of hunger or bodily pain, may excite the softer expression of weeping; but no sooner has he grown in years, than similar causes, even to torture, pain, and death, cease to draw a tear; and thus sighs and groans suppressed, indicate the triumph of spirit over matter.

In forming the conclusion, that the developement of the faculty of perception in a child, is the very beginning

of intellect and language, it seems requisite to bear in mind how far, in their early stages of being, the state of the human species and that of the brute creation are analogous: and also to recollect, that *instinctive* signs bear no resemblance whatever to *language*: for the signs of *language* or *parts of speech* are conventional: they are agreed upon by the mutual and respective compact of individual nations throughout the world: the signs of *instinct* are not conventional, they are not agreed upon by compact, but are fixed and determined throughout the whole of every species according to the particular and uncontrollable laws of nature: and are supposed to have been so ever since the beginning of the creation.

CHAP. III.

Comparison between the perceptive faculty, as observable in an infant or child, with the same faculty in the adult—example drawn from a view of objects at sea—elucidation of three elementary parts of speech—five parts of speech elucidated by four balls—conceptions of novelty as giving birth to the expression of ideas—their differences—substantive the primitive part of speech—correspondence of the argument with that of Locke and the Bishop of Worcester respecting substance—transpositive idiom of language affording an additional argument in favour of the hypothesis—the verb consequently not the primitive—the theory embracing such a doctrine proved to be false.

IT is perfectly consistent with just reasoning to compare the first operation of the perceptive faculty of a child, recognizing indistinctly the few or many objects around him, with the operation of the same faculty in a man, viewing indistinctly a few or many objects at a distance. The results arising from every man's own individual experience will convince him, that his notions concerning objects which appear foreign to his senses, will be either restrained or enlarged in proportion to

their proximity or remoteness. This is peculiarly evidenced at sea by sailors on their first notice of an island, and their gradual approaches towards it. Or, perhaps, the analogy now proposed will appear stronger, were we to imagine a fleet or sail of ships, closely moving together, to be just observable to the naked eye of an individual on a desert island. The whole might seem as *one only*:—*one object*. Now let me put the question: At the instant of their observing the fleet or sail of ships, what would be the idea passing in the minds of the beholders, who are supposed to be ignorant as to the real state or quality of the object. What would be the thought or character imprinted on the mind of an individual person so situated? We are not long in determining that the *meaning which we attach to the part of speech, object, or thing*, would be fitly correspondent to the meaning of that outward sign, expression, or part of speech, which such an individual would use to communicate the purport of his conception of the fleet. We will next imagine this fleet, designated by the sign, *object, or thing*, to have approached sufficiently near to be discovered by the naked eye, as consisting of a number of *separate objects or things*; till at length they appear of *different dimensions*. The question again returns:—What would be the ideas passing in the mind of the beholder, and the outward signs of communication which he would use to correspond with his increased ideas? Would not the meaning of the signs correspond with the meaning which we attach to the qualities, or adjectives, or parts of speech, *large and small*? The affirmative being granted, we suppose him to join the signs *large and small*, to the former sign *object*, making together *object large or large object—object small or small ob-*

ject. Of these interchanges it may be just remarked, that they evidently point out a difference of meaning. In the one instance, viz. *object large*, an affirmation is made respecting the thing or object; in the other, viz. *large object*, (according to the English idiom) an affirmation is not made: *large object* is a mere name, a mark or sign of an idea, and nothing else. This I shall endeavour to explain in its proper place. But suppose the person to have discovered the moving of the object, (presupposing that he was before conscious of the state of *not moving*, but which, perhaps, is not very good reasoning), before he noticed it to have consisted of a number of separate objects: the current idea in his mind, in this (supposed) case, would entirely correspond with the meaning which we affix to the word *moving*. *Object moving* or *moving object*. The same remarks respecting the interchanges are applicable as before; viz. that in the one instance an affirmation is made, in the other that an affirmation is not made: and that all these signs, *large*, *small*, and *moving*, are signs of "*qualities, modes, or accidents*:" but the last sign or part of speech exhibits a relation very different from that of *large* or *small*. These are attributes of the object or thing; *moving* is not: it is an instance of the same object or thing with all its attributes *in the state of moving*. But we will suppose the vessels to have now arrived, and the beholders to be viewing with wonder and astonishment the stupendous machinery—the variety of stores;—to be observing the qualities, size, make, shape, colour, teint, and shade of the *things*. No sooner have their wonder and their admiration subsided, than they begin to mark the fitness of each to some particular end; and, in order that they may reason upon their various properties and uses,

without the labour and inconvenience of resorting to violent gesticulation, they adopt oral distinctions. Appropriate signs are very soon invented to correspond with the various qualities, and these are added as before to the term *thing* already fixed upon: the latter of which, in the course of time, becomes obsolete, and the former is agreed upon by mutual compact to be the sign, type, or *name*, of the particular object or thing.—“To assign names to surrounding objects,” says Dr. Crombie, “would be the first care of barbarous nations; their next essay would be to express their most common actions or states of being. This, indeed, is the order of nature—the progress of intellect.”*

Two balls, of equal size and colour, placed upon a table, will serve for further elucidation. Two adjectives, *small* and *red*, explain the size and colour of the balls: and, as far as both adjectives are concerned, what is true of the one is true of the other. But one of the balls is seen to move, while the other remains stationary: here, then, is a new relation. The ball *moving* or the *moving* ball: and the ball *remaining* or *resting*, or the *remaining* or *resting* ball. The moving ball is seen to strike the resting ball: here we have another relation, or *passive* state of the thing or object: a third ball is now introduced, which is observed to move swifter than the other moving ball: and now another relation is discovered: the *manner* of the moving. Let it now be supposed that the three balls are stationary. I take one of them, and, placing it closely to one of the remaining, set it in motion towards the other. The spectator observes another relation, viz. moving *to* one, and moving *from* the other;

* Dr. Crombie's Treatise on the Etymology and Syntax of the English Language.

so that *to* and *from* are middle terms, appearing to belong to one ball as much as to the other; yet we can distinctly trace an adjective meaning in both; viz. the *to*-moving-ball and the *from*-moving-ball. Let it again be supposed, that the balls are at rest, and that a *fourth* ball is introduced *moving*. We now observe the relation of *time*; the *present*-moving-ball, and the *past*-moving-ball: and here might be developed the various relations of the tenses of a verb.

Novelty is the most natural feeling of the mind; and the faculty by which we discover the objects of novelty is called judgment. The business of the judgment is that of discovering differences. In the very threshold of the philosophy of language, this faculty, though in a state of infancy, exerts its influence: the conceptions of novelty give birth to the expression of ideas, to the various modifications of them, and to all the signs and characteristic marks of the qualities of their differences, whether they be the mode and manner of their being, acting, or suffering.

It is now easy to conceive, that the substantive must have been the original part of speech, and that, according to the nature and proportion of differences in substantives, soon were invented the adjective, the verb, and the adverb: the thing or object being the substantive, and the "mode, accident, or quality," the adjective, verb, or adverb. And this corresponds exactly with Locke's notion of substance, and agrees entirely with the conceptions of the Bishop of Worcester, who opposed some of the passages in "The Essay of Human Understanding," in his discourse in vindication of the Trinity: where he says "we find we can have no true conception of any *mode* or *accidents*, but we must con-

ceive a SUBSTRATUM OF SUBJECT WHEREIN THEY ARE: since it is a repugnancy to our conceptions of things, that *modes* or *accidents* should subsist by themselves.”*

As, therefore, the differences in the appearances of things or objects, in the infancy of language, were designated by the new sign signifying quality, so arose the adjective: and further, as the differences in the qualities of things or objects, at the next step towards the improvement of language, were distinguished by another new sign, signifying being, acting, or suffering, so arose the verb: and what the adjective is to the substantive, so the adverb is to the verb: the *adjective* defines the *quality* of the *substantive*, the *adverb* defines the *quality* of the *verb*—that is to say, the *state* of the substantive.

If we consider the nature of the transpositive idiom, the order of words as they occur in the construction of sentences in the Greek and Latin tongues, the present hypothesis will be furnished with an additional argument in its favour. The nature of language will be then further unfolded to our view: the consideration will, moreover, present to us one of the principal causes which have influenced the alteration of language during the progress of man's civilization. But we must traverse back, as before, to the most uncultivated period of society; and a short extract from the writings of Dr. Blair will not only answer our purpose, but also serve for general corroboration.

“ Let us figure to ourselves a savage, beholding some object, such as fruit, which he earnestly desires, and requests another to give him. Suppose him unacquainted with words: he would then strive to make himself un-

* *Bishop of Worcester*, quoted in *Locke's* first Letter, page 41.

derstood by pointing eagerly at the object which he desired, and uttering at the same time a passionate cry. Supposing him to have acquired words, the first word which he uttered would, consequently, be the name of that object. He would not express himself according to our order of construction, 'Give me fruit,' but according to the Latin order, 'Fruit give me,'—'*Fructum da mihi*:' for this evident reason, that his attention was wholly directed towards fruit, the object of his desire. From hence," says Dr. Blair, "we might conclude, *a priori*, that this would be the order in which words were most commonly arranged in the infancy of language; and accordingly we find, in reality, that in this order words are arranged in most of the ancient tongues, as in the Greek and the Latin; and it is said likewise, in the Russian, the Slavonic, and Gaelic, and several of the American tongues." *

If the arguments which I have adopted are just, then it undeniably follows, that the *noun* or *adjective* is the original or fundamental part of speech; and that the theory which embraces a principle to shew that the *verb* is the original part of speech, must be false; not only because it sets forward upon the supposition that man, grown in intellect, contemplates the nature of his necessities, and so discovers, or endeavours to select such objects as shall be likely to alleviate and satisfy them; but because the supposition implies in itself an evident contradiction. The promulger of such a theory supposes that the *want* or *desire* of an individual is really the action of the verb in artificial language. But if this mode of reasoning were accurate, the mere want or desire would not con-

* Dr. Blair's Lectures.

stitute a *part of speech* or *word*! nor a part of *thought*! Animal wants are occasioned by certain involuntary sensations; and are wholly acts of instinct: words are voluntary articulations; the primary object of which is intellectual communication. A man, who was born dumb, and who has since been taught to articulate, is actuated by feelings of want and desire; the inferior creatures are influenced by wants and desires in common with men; and the inferior creatures are emphatically called *dumb animals*. But, let it be asked, who has ever accused the dumb man, or the inferior creature, of uttering a part of speech? Such a theorist asserts, also, that in naming a person, we can have no idea of him but in a state of being, acting, or suffering; therefore, he infers that the *verb* was antecedent to the *substantive*. Let it be retorted: what idea can I or any man have of the state of the being, acting, or suffering of *any thing* independently of *something*? None: because "we can have no true conception of any *mode* or *accidents*, but we must conceive a SUBSTRATUM OR SUBJECT WHEREIN THEY ARE."* To assert, therefore, that the *verb* is the original part of speech, i. e. that the verb is antecedent to the *substantive*, implies a contradiction. It is implying that *a thing is before it is*; which is a manifest absurdity: "*Nam quod non est agere non potest; nec ipsa res esse potuit, antequam esset.*"†

* Bishop of Worcester and Locke.

† Grotius.

CHAP. IV.

The nature of the verb—its being, action, &c.—time—preliminary elucidations deduced from the action and re-action of balls—metaphysical science recommended—verb the life of language, but not the cause of the existence of the substantive—atheistical philosophy—an exposition of its absurdities recommended, as subsidiary to the theory for unfolding the force and application of the verb.

LET us next endeavour to unravel more fully the nature of the verb. *The moving ball.* Moving is evidently of the nature of an adjective; but it is of a nature different from the adjectives *red* and *hard*. *The red, hard ball.* *The moving-red-hard-ball.* *Red* and *hard* indicate two of the qualities of the ball; but *moving* points out the quality of its *state*. Let two of these balls be placed upon the table. Let one of them be gently struck; the relations before explained will be recognized. One is the *moving* ball, the other is the *remaining* or *resting* ball. Suppose the *moving* ball to be now destroyed; we perceive all its relations, which have been named, to be likewise destroyed. The mind, however, reflects upon its experience; and the memory dwells upon the state of the remaining ball, object, or thing. The mind remembers the expedient of adopting the opposite term, *moving*, to that of *resting*. But the mind perceives, that, in this instance, it can discover no opposite term to that of *remaining* or *resting*; it wants the *substratum* by which every *mode* or *accident* is said to *be* or *exist*: and *something* can have no relation to *nothing*. The *nomen*, or name, *moving ball*, however, is stored up in the memory. We now strike the remaining ball; and discover the quality or state of moving in this to be the same as that of the ball which is destroyed: we, therefore, reasonably conclude, that what is true of this

was also true of the other. The difference between this and the *name*, moving ball, is now more apparent. The one is *nomen substantivum*, and the other simply *nomen*. Suppose the ball *substans*, or remaining, to be at rest: we now introduce another ball, *moving*; this is perceived to strike the other. One is called the *moving*, the other the *moved* ball; but, in fact, each is both *moved* and *moving*; for motion has been given, and is still continued, to both.—Before, therefore, we can arrive at any tolerable notion of the action of a verb, we feel the necessity of ascending a few steps higher than mere dead matter will carry us. Our reflexions must be concentrated and exercised upon and about *ourselves*, our *being*, and *existence*. In performing this operation of the mind, we must be careful not to confound and blend *appetite*, *passion*, and *intellect* with LANGUAGE. Words and language are the vocal and articulated signs and transcriptions of our thoughts and ideas, by which we are enabled to communicate those thoughts and ideas to others. This is the true meaning and use of language or speech; than which there is no other meaning nor signification to be attached to the word. The *verb* may be called the *life* of language; but the life of language must not be confounded with the materials, the mechanism, or the progress of language, any more than the intellectual life of man must be confounded with the material part of man. The blood which is the supposed vehicle of life in an animal, cannot exert itself as that vehicle without the power of motion; the cause, therefore, of that power of motion may be considered as the immediate cause of the life of an animal. The cause of this power is God. “He is the one supreme and perfect Being—independent in his existence, infinite in his

wisdom, eternal in his duration—the Author of all power, the Source of all life, the cause of all motion.”* But the verb or life, as it has been called, of language, is not the cause of the existence of the substantive, or the *substratum*, any more than the life of man is the cause of his corporeal being, or of his material organization. † To assert otherwise than this respecting language, is, according to Dr. Hales, to agree with the doctrine of “ancient and modern professors of atheistical philosophy;” who represent “the faculty of articulate speech, or language, as the mere *instinctive* expression of the wants and desires of a herd of associated savages, gra-

* Remarks on Scepticism, &c. by the Rev. T. Rennell, page 124.

† Neither is material organization the cause of the life of a man. “An organ is an instrument. Organization, therefore, is nothing more than a system of parts so constructed and arranged, as to co-operate to one common purpose. This orderly disposition of parts exists generally, though a particular part may be disturbed, after its subject has ceased to live. The ear is the organ of hearing, and its correspondence with the brain exists as much in the dead, as in the living body. Most of our knowledge, indeed, of this organization, or arrangement of parts, and how they co-operate and mutually support each other, has been derived from our observations upon the dead subject. Organization has been confounded with life, because without organization, life, or the continuance of active existence, is not to be found; and because when organization in some particular parts is disturbed, active existence ceases. But because no musical sounds can be produced without an instrument, and because if that instrument be disordered, those musical sounds cannot be elicited, no one would argue that a flute or a trumpet is a musical sound. The instrument may still remain, though not in a state of order sufficient to produce its effect; and general organization may exist, though from a deficiency in one particular part, life has been extinguished. The rupture or disturbance of one single part, though it may put a stop to the activity, yet it does not necessarily violate the arrangement of the thousands which compose the animal body.”—Remarks on Scepticism, &c. pages 80 and 81.

dually invented for mutual convenience of communication, and established by mutual consent."*

To expose, therefore, the absurdities of atheistical and sceptical philosophy will promote our inquiries respecting the nature of the verb, and enable us to answer the question of Horne Tooke, † or rather to distinguish the relation which the verb bears to the substantive. This exposition is reserved for the discussion of two separate chapters.

CHAP. V.

Grotius—Locke—Bichat—Morgan—Lawrence—Rennell—true philosophy—body—soul—leading faculties of the soul—passions—Aristotle—Cicero—three distinct faculties of the soul—the soul nevertheless undivided—metaphysical writers—their inaccurate definitions of the passions—lecturer of Trinity College, Dublin—Dr. Hutcheson—no exciting reason previous to affection and instinct—excitement to the faculty of judging dependent on the will—Locke's definition of passion proved to be incorrect—appetite—affection—passions—definitions.

RES aliquas esse, quæ esse cœperint, sensu ipso et confessione omnium constat. Eæ autem res sibi non fuerunt causa ut essent : nam quod non est agere non potest ; nec ipsa res esse potuit, antequam esset. Sequitur igitur, ut aliunde habuerint sui originem ; quod non tantùm de illis rebus, quas ipsi aut conspeximus aut conspeximus, fatendum est ; sed et de iis, unde illæ ortum habent ; donec tandem ad aliquam causam perveniamus, quæ esse nunquam cœperit : quæque sit, ut loqui solemus, non contingenter, sed necessariò. Hoc

* Dr. HALKS, *D'Oyly and Mant's Bible*.

† "What is that peculiar differential circumstance, which, added to the definition of a noun, constitutes a verb?"

antem, quaecunque tandem sit, id ipsum est, quod Numinis aut Dei voce significatur.—*H. Grotius De Ver. Rel. Chris.*

“*Every thing,*” says Locke, “*that has a beginning must have a cause,*—it is a true principle of reason, or a proposition certainly true; which we come to know by contemplating our ideas, and perceiving that the idea of *beginning to be* is necessarily connected with the idea of *some operation*, and the idea of *operation*, with the idea of *something operating*, which we call a *cause*; and so the beginning to be, is perceived to agree with the idea of a *cause*, as is expressed in the proposition; and thus it comes to be a certain proposition; and so may be called a *principle of reason*, as every true proposition is to him that perceives the certainty of it.”—*Locke’s first Letter to the Bishop of Worcester.*

From these passages we can easily suppose how the great Locke would have answered the doctrines of modern sceptics respecting matter, and also their notions of the organization of matter as the cause of life. But the dogmas of M. Bichat, Sir T. C. Morgan, and Mr. Lawrence, have lately been very ably exposed.

“Of these three gentlemen,” say the Edinburgh Monthly Reviewers,* “M. Bichat is the only one who has intelligibly communicated his notions upon the subject. If Mr. Lawrence understands the doctrine, he has been very unhappy in his reasonings upon it. But as for Sir T. C. Morgan, it will be quite plain to any one who will be so bold as to examine his writings, that he has adopted the doctrine without understanding it in any tolerable degree.”

* Number 13;—Article: *Remarks on Scepticism*, by Rennell.

"After confounding life and organization," continue the Reviewers, "these gentlemen very naturally proceed to confound matter and mind, body and soul. Mr. Lawrence very plainly declares himself satisfied that the *brain* is not merely the instrument by which the mind carries on its operations, but that it is of itself capable of thought; and is, in fact, that which is called mind or soul.—To this ridiculous conclusion they have arrived from mere confusion of terms and definitions, and from totally neglecting to consider those distinctions between mind and matter, with which every ordinary man is familiar."

"Mr. Rennell first exposes the mistakes on the subject of life into which M. Bichat has fallen. M. Bichat does not admit of any such thing as *intellectual* life. He has described life as of two kinds, *organic* and *animal*. Organic life is that which, he says, is common to animals and vegetables; and the passions, he says, are among the functions of organic life. After quoting the passage in which those opinions are expressed, Mr. Rennell says:—'Thus, then, according to M. Bichat, a cabbage and a man, having the functions of organic life in common, and the passions being among those functions, it follows, that jealousy, anger, revenge, and love, are the common affections of the man and the cabbage. It will be seen, at a glance, that the fallacy consists in emitting to distinguish those passions, such as jealousy, anger, &c. which have their origin and gratification entirely in the mind, from those of sensuality, &c. which require the instrumentality of outward organs.'—'In another place," say the Edinburgh Monthly

* *Remarks on Scepticism*, &c. page 58.

Reviewers, "M. Bichat attempts to shew, that the passions are the result of our material organization, and that, therefore, they cannot be softened, nor their sphere contracted, because they are not under the influence of the will. And yet the very man who entertains this opinion, has asserted, that education may bestow such perfection on the judgment and reflection as to make them more powerful than the passions. Mr. Rennell having extracted both these passages, makes the following excellent observations :"—*Edinburgh Monthly Review*, No. 13.

'The very exercise of this superior power of judgment and reflection must ultimately depend upon the will, as every man's self-experience will inform him: and if the impulse of the passions is thus subdued, it can only be by restraint, and where there is restraint, the sphere must be virtually contracted. As far, therefore, as the theory of M. Bichat is intelligible, it contains within itself a gross contradiction.'

'To such paltry sophistry, and such palpable abstractions, are men of the highest professional eminence reduced, when they would annihilate that first, that noblest gift of God to man—THE IMMORTAL SOUL.'—*Remarks on Scepticism*, page 59.

The Creator, having fashioned man after his own image, and proclaimed the exalted purpose of his existence, hath wisely ordained that a state of total inactivity shall not be conducive to happiness, or even temporary satisfaction.

The true philosopher is persuaded that the body is mortal and that the soul is immortal;* that, taken ab-

* Since the Author of our being has planted no wandering passion in us, no desire which has not its object, futurity is the proper object of the

stractedly, the one is pure, and the other is impure, that the earthly part of man is grovelling, that it is a machine, a mere engine to the reasoning part of him, interested in no one thing but appetite, present enjoyment, and self-preservation: and these it pursues as the greatest possible good!—while the other, qualified with memory and reflection, reason and judgment, affection, love, and hope, contemplates, with joy, the design and use of its present existence; it feels that this lower world is not to be its resting place; that it is destined for some nobler end. Man, therefore, is endowed with intellectual susceptibility, that he may mark the changes of his nature and the vicissitudes of human life; that he may dignify his manners with rectitude of conduct, and so fit the soul for future emancipation.

The principal or leading faculties of the soul are, perhaps, better displayed by some of the Christian Fathers,* than by either Aristotle or Cicero. In treating of the passions, Aristotle considered only the outward circumstances of them; and the remarks of Cicero, in discoursing of the power and nature of the mind, evidently shew, that with the passions he blended the appetites; for, in his Offices, wrath, lust, fear, and pleasure, have been indiscriminately called by him passions.

While the memory, the understanding, and the will, passion so constantly exercised about it; and this restlessness in the present, this assigning ourselves over to farther stages of duration, this successive grasping at somewhat still to come, appears to me a kind of instinct or natural symptom, which the mind of man has of its own immortality.—*Addison*.

* Now when I turn my eyes inward, says St. Bernard, I discover three distinct faculties in my soul, whereby I am qualified to remember, and contemplate, and desire God—these are the memory, the understanding, and the will: et seq.—*Vide chap. 1, St. Bernard's Book of the Soul*.

are to be regarded as three distinct faculties, by which we remember, contemplate, and desire, we must be sensible, that these powers cannot be separated from one another, and that, consequently, there can be no absolute division in the soul itself; for it is the whole soul which exercises these faculties, the whole soul which wills or imagines, understands or remembers.

But writers on metaphysical science have not given very accurate definitions of the passions. Independently of their admission of the divine and separate principle of life, they are not more philosophic in their notions respecting the passions than those who have transcribed the doctrines of materialism as promulgated by writers of the French school of infidelity.

Excepting one or two, all the volumes with which we are acquainted do not, in this particular, seem to exemplify any order or principle. In the middle of the last century, the lecturer of oratory on the foundation of Erasmus Smith, Esq. in Dublin, seemed to enter fully into these ideas, when he endeavoured to unravel perplexities which modern metaphysicians had then thrown upon the performances of the ancients; and if I am not insufficiently read in the present subject, Dr. Lawson was the first of the modern Professors of *Rhetoric*, who endeavoured to systematize the passions for the use of students in oratory. But while this tribute of attention is offered to the memory of the Lecturer of Trinity College exclusively, we must not enter into the ideas implied in the apology of the Doctor at the conclusion of the tenth lecture, expressly intimating not only that rhetoricians had defined the passions imperfectly, but that moralists had fallen into similar negligences: that his ideas on the subject were completely new, and, therefore,

that the theory would be viewed as an innovation, and so be liable to censure. Now this was evidently advanced to the exclusion of the disquisitions contained in the voluminous treatises of Dr. Hutcheson on the passions, the best, perhaps, extant: books which had been published only a few years before, and which caused controversy sufficient to produce ample illustrations of the moral sense; books which prove to us, in direct terms, that there can be no exciting reason previously to affection, instinct, or the moral faculty; and that the conscience is distinct from the sense of moral good and evil; so, we conclude that what taste is to natural discernment, conscience is to the moral sense,—improved by knowledge and care.

The qualities or effects produced from the faculties of the soul might not unaptly be called *volition, judgment, and knowledge*.* Dr. Lawson defines passion to be the will acting with vehemence; but I think it appears pretty evident that passion is *feeling, modified by intellect and the experience of sensation*. “Writers,” says Dr. Lawson, “agree in mentioning two faculties of the mind, of undoubted reality, and altogether different, the understanding and the will. Next after which they place, as different springs of action, the passions; in this last, it seems, they are mistaken: for look into your own breasts,” says the Doctor, “is not the case thus? You apprehend a certain object to be good; you instantly desire to obtain it; if it be of much importance, vehemently. What then is will, what passion? are they not the same operation, differing but in degree? For observe, the general act of desiring we name willing;† add

* This is similar to the division of St. Bernard.

† It was the opinion of Locke, that desiring and willing are two distinct acts of the mind. But his illustrations do not appear to be

hereto heat, ardour, it is passion. Passion then," says the Doctor, "is the will acting with vehemence."* Now to disprove the accuracy of this corrected definition, we need only refer to the faculties of *volition*, *judgment*, and *knowledge*. Independently of reason and experience, the first, "*volition*," includes only instinct and appetite, but, connected with them, it comprises every other modification of feeling, from the calmest of all possible desire, to the most violent impetus of emotion, and astonishment, and every feeling of energetic passion; and however the second, "*judgment*," may be said to comprehend abstract as well as concrete ideas, and to discover differences, excitement to the faculty of judging is, in a manner, dependent on the *will*; for were there none other power in the soul but contemplation, says Dr. Hutcheson, there would be no affection, volition, desire, or action; further, without some motion of *will*, no man would voluntarily persevere in contemplation, there must be a *desire* of knowledge and of the pleasure which attends it; and this too is an act of *willing*.

conclusive. "A man," says Locke, "whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to use persuasions to another which, at the same time I am speaking, I may wish may not prevail upon him. In this case," continues Locke, "'tis plain the will and desire run counter. I will the action that tends one way, whilst my desire tends another, and that the direct contrary." The reason, I humbly conceive, is because a stronger conquers the weaker desire. Again, "A man, who by a violent fit of the gout in his limbs, finds a dozingness in his head, or a want of appetite in his stomach removed, desires to be eased too of the pain of his feet or hands, (for where there is pain there is desire to be ridden of it) though yet whilst he apprehends that the removal of the pain may translate the noxious humour to a more vital part, his *will* is never determined to any one action that may serve to remove the pain." What does this prove more than that the will is prudently restrained by the superior energies of the intellectual faculty?

* Lectures concerning Oratory; by John Lawson, D.D. page 156.

Taking this for granted, Dr. Lawson and the writers quoted by him, are all partly wrong and all partly right. Passions are not springs of action different from the will, but they are the will, or feelings of the will, modified by experience.

Having been furnished with the elaborate treatises of Dr. Hutcheson, and the subsequent disquisitions of the learned Dublin Professor, Mr. Lawrence might have been convinced that the passions are not the result of material organization. And it is a matter of surprise that E. Burke, Blair, Ward, Herries, Sheridan, Walker, and other men of eminence, have not given more ample definitions of the passions, than as *feelings* or *organs* of the soul, modifications, affections, or instincts; so that *appetites*, *affections*, and *passions*, three distinct modifications of feeling, are mingled and thrown confusedly together.

It is plain, from the definition of the passion of love in the Essay concerning Human Understanding, that the ideas of Locke on passion were imperfect; "Thus," says the author, "any one reflecting upon the thought he has of the delight which any present or absent thing is apt to produce in him, has the idea we call love.* For when a man declares in autumn, when he is eating them, or in spring, when there are none, that he *loves grapes*, it is no more, but that the taste of grapes delights him; let an alteration of health or constitution destroy the delight of the *taste*, and he then can be said to love grapes no longer."† To disprove this description, which

* That is, the passion of love; for having next defined hatred, the writer observes, "were it my business here to inquire any farther than into the bare *idea of passions*," &c.

† Locke's Essay, chap. 20.

indeed is none other than of appetite, it may be merely noticed, that it is the union of *affection* with another modification of feeling, called *appetite*, which constitutes *PASSION*: so that if "alteration of health or constitution" produces an effect in the animal system, similar to the above illustration of Locke, it is possible for the *affection* of love still to remain perfect. Does not the story of Eloisa and Abelard exemplify this? or is there not in the world such a feeling of the mind as *affection* between the *senses*? "Love," says Dr. Smith, "is a violent, hot, and impetuous *passion*: *esteem* is a sedate, and cool, and peaceable *affection* of the *mind*." This is beautifully illustrated by a modern dramatist:* "Listen to me, child. I would proffer you friendship, for your own sake—for the sake of benevolence. When ages, indeed, are nearly equal, nature is prone to breathe so warmly on the blossoms of friendship between the sexes, that the fruit is desire; but Time, fair one, is scattering snow on my temples, while Hebe waves her freshest ringlets over yours. Rely then on one who has encountered difficulties enough to teach him sympathy; and who would stretch forth his hand to a wandering female, and shelter her like a father."

Appetite is peculiar to the animal, and discovers itself antecedently to any idea of good in the object, by uneasy sensation. This seems to be an admirable contrivance of the Deity to counterbalance the absence of reason; that animals, without it, may provide for their necessities, and regulate the ties, the nice dependencies which bind them to their species. The affections of man may be said properly to belong to the soul: they are

* Mr. George Colman, the younger.

feelings of calm desire or aversion, instituted by catenation or association of idea; or, in other language, established by *affinity of mind* or *correspondence of spiritual substance*. Now the passions are feelings which seem to be confused bodily and mental sensations, either of pleasure or of pain; they are feelings or springs of action which connect our rational or imaginary ideas of good or evil.—*The outward attributes of the passions are visible in the face and other parts of the body.*

If we regard the structure of the human mind, as only capable of attending to one object or set of objects at a time, we shall immediately conceive, that, unless the organs of the body and faculties of the soul are adequately attuned, confusion of thought, idea, and expression, will be the natural consequence. Further: when the mind is in action, any sudden impetus of congenial, pleasurable, or painful bodily motion, will so prolong or invigorate the existing affection, as frequently to distract and confound still more the reasoning faculty, and so pervert altogether the *moral sense*. Thus the thief is deluded by the idea of gain and riches; and this keeps him from considering or having any dread of the evil, which lies sheltered under the false notion of gain; of the desire that degrades his soul, and taints it with injustice. And then, as for any apprehension of discovery, imprisonment, and punishment, which are the only calamities dreaded by men of this description, his excessive eagerness utterly overlooks and stifles all these; for he presently represents to himself what a world of men do such things, and yet are never found out.* On the other hand, when the passions are animated by the moral sense, they serve as so many springs to virtuous actions.

* Sulpicius's Commentary upon Epictetus, chap. 2:

The passions, as well as the affections,* therefore, are feelings, or secret springs of action, modified by association of idea. The affections are wholly intellectual; the passions are partly intellectual and partly corporeal. Hence the passions are the mental and corporeal effects of certain peculiar sensations which have been impressed on the mind by various mechanical stimuli. When the mind is anxious of possessing objects which are expected to yield agreeable impressions, such anticipations are called *hope*. The actual possession of the objects desired is called *joy*.—The ideas or reflexions of such objects between the *sexes* excite the *passion of love*.—

“ Good shepherd, tell this youth what ’tis to love !”

“ It is to be all made of phantasy :

All made of passion and all made of wishes :

All adoration, duty, and obedience :

All humbleness, all patience, and impatience :

All purity, all trial, all observance.”†

“ As soon as a heart, before hard and obdurate, is softened in this flame, we shall observe arising along with it,” says Dr. Hutcheson, “ a love of poetry, music, the beauty of nature in rural scenes, a contempt of the selfish pleasures of the external senses, a neat dress, a benevolent deportment, a delight in, and emulation of every thing which is gallant, generous, and friendly.”

The probability of enduring sensations which have before caused disagreeable impressions, excites the passion of fear: the suffering of them, grief: the ideas of the objects, hatred.

* “ The internal affections necessarily arise according to our opinion of their objects.”—“ *An Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil*,” page 288.—*Hutcheson*.

† Shakspeare’s *Winter’s Tale*.

According to these definitions and illustrations, the passions correspond with various ideas which men have of *rational desire or aversion*; and, as before mentioned, they are accompanied by confused bodily sensations: and the external attributes of them are visible in the face and various parts of the body:—so that the impressions of *good* or pleasurable objects excite *love*; and those of *evil* or painful objects excite *hatred*:—and they are variously modified in proportion to the degree of the certainty or uncertainty of the presence or absence of the good or evil. The passions, consequently, arise from a sense of right and wrong.*

This compendium corresponds with the account of Dr. Hutcheson; which the following short extract will prove:—

“ We may easily conceive our affections and passions,” says Hutcheson, “ in this manner. The apprehension of good, either to ourselves or others, as attainable, raises *desire*; the like apprehension of evil, or of the loss of good, raises *aversion*, or desire of removing or preventing it. These two are the proper *affections*, distinct from all *sensation*: we may call both *desires* if we please. The reflection upon the presence or certain futurity of any good, raises the sensation of joy, which is distinct from those immediate sensations which arise from the object itself. A like sensation is raised, when we reflect upon the removal or prevention of evil which once threatened ourselves or others. The reflection upon the presence of evil, or the certain prospect of it, or of the loss of good, is the occasion of the sensation of *sorrow*,

* Dramatic and epic poetry are entirely addressed to this sense, and raise our passions by the fortunes of characters, distinctly represented as naturally good or evil.—Hutcheson.

distinct from the *immediate sensations* arising from the objects or events themselves. These affections, viz. *desire, aversion, joy, and sorrow*, we may, after MALBRANCHE,* continue Hutcheson, “call *spiritual or pure affections*; because the purest spirit, were it subject to any evil, might be capable of them. But beside these affections, which seem to arise necessarily from a rational apprehension of good or evil, there are in our nature *violent confused sensations*, connected with *bodily motions*, from which our *affections* are denominated *passions*.”*

CHAP. VI.

Locke's notion of matter and substance—controversy between Locke and the Bishop of Worcester—the inference of Locke shewn to be the highest *probability* and *opinion*; that of the Bishop of Worcester, the *demonstration* and *certainty*, that “the thinking thing in us is immaterial”—argument of modern chemists confuted—the commencement of the study of philosophy and true theoretic science aided by the light of Revelation.

IF there is any truth in these remarks, it is plain, that the notion of Locke respecting passion began and ended in the “instrumentality of the outward organs.” But it is presumed, that this should be merely viewed as an oversight; it ought not to be received as a reason for concluding, that the author of “The Essay on Human Understanding” would have agreed with M. Bichat in his conception respecting the “*passion of a cabbage!*” and for this evident reason; because the arguments of Locke respecting the passions, do not, by any means, correspond with those which he himself has brought for-

* *The Nature and Conduct of the Passions*, pages 62 and 68.—Hutcheson.

ward concerning matter and spiritual substance. But the arguments of Locke on these subjects have been strangely misunderstood. It very commonly happens, that those who have read detached passages only of one side of a controversy, are the very persons who arrogate to themselves the power and right of deciding upon the merits of all that has been said and written upon it. Thus, from a hasty perusal of one or two detached sentences, to be selected from the celebrated controversy of Locke and the Bishop of Worcester, the name even of the great and enlightened author of "The Essay on Human Understanding" has been impugned. But those who, in any tolerable degree, are acquainted with this controversy, will perceive, that when the author of the "Remarks on Scepticism," says that matter is incapable of thought, he is supported in the most unqualified manner by Locke. "If we suppose nothing to be first, matter can never begin to be; if we suppose bare matter without motion to be eternal, motion can never begin to be: if matter and motion be supposed eternal, thought can never begin to be; for if matter could produce thought, then thought must be in the power of matter; and if it be in matter as such, it must be the inseparable property of all matter; which is contrary to the sense and experience of mankind." This is the substance of the argument used by Locke, to prove an infinite spiritual being: and was agreeable to the opinions of his antagonist, the Bishop of Worcester; who cited the passage to shew that he was "far from weakening the force of it." And yet there are some men, such individuals as have been mentioned, or individuals but a few gradations removed from them, and most undoubtedly of sceptical opinions, who maintain that a sedulous perusal of the writings of

Locke would tend to make the reader a materialist. The remarks of these persons are most artfully introduced to the minds of the young, with a mention of the well-known conclusion of Locke, that "all the great ends of morality and religion are well enough secured without a *demonstration that the thinking thing in us is immaterial.*" The meaning of this sentence is no sooner received by artless and unwary young men, than their preceptor quotes a detached sentence from the "Essay on Human Understanding," to shew "that we have the ideas of matter and thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know whether any material being thinks or not; it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to discover whether omnipotency hath not given to some systems of matter, fitly disposed, a power to perceive or think." The sceptic (no doubt very charitably) assists his pupil to interpret the passage in perverting the language and argument of the antagonist of Locke to his own purpose. "If this be true then, for all that we can know by our ideas of matter and thinking, matter may have a power of thinking; and if this hold, then it is impossible to prove a spiritual substance in us, from the idea of thinking; for how can we be assured by our ideas, that God hath not given such a power of thinking, to matter so disposed as our bodies are? Especially since it is said, 'that in respect of our notions, it is not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive that God can, if he pleases, superadd to our idea of matter a faculty of thinking.'" It is then answered, "whoever asserts this can never prove a spiritual substance in us from a faculty of thinking; because he cannot know from the idea of matter and thinking, that matter so disposed cannot

think. And he cannot be certain, that God hath not framed the matter of our bodies so as to be capable of it." If this conclusion from the passage in the Essay on Human Understanding were just, it would then follow that the opinions of Locke were correspondent with those contained in the French philosophy. It is presumed that the true state of the case is otherwise. In the passage alluded to, Locke meant no more than that "A thinking substance *may* be combined with a stone, a tree, or an *animal body*; but that not one of the three can of *itself* become a thinking being:" and "what is true of one material substance, is true of every other; for all matter, whether *organic* or *inorganic*, fluid or solid, is endowed with the same essential properties."* But let the immortal Locke speak for himself. "Your Lordship argues, that upon my principles *it cannot be proved that there is* a spiritual substance in us. To which give me leave, with submission, to say, that I think it may be proved from my principles, and I think I have done it; and the proof in my book stands thus. First, we experiment in ourselves *thinking*. The idea of this action or mode of thinking, is inconsistent with the idea of self subsistence, and therefore has a necessary connexion with a support or subject of inhesion: the idea of that support is what we call *substance*; and so from thinking experimented in us, we have a proof of a *thinking substance* in us, which in *my sense is a spirit*. Against this your Lordship will argue, that by what I have said of the possibility that God may, if he pleases, superadd to matter a faculty of thinking, it can never be proved that there is a spiritual substance in us, because upon that

* *Remarks on Scepticism*, page 89.

supposition it is possible it may be a material substance that thinks in us. I grant it; but add, that the general idea of substance being the same every where, the modification of thinking, or the power of thinking joined to it, makes it a spirit, without considering what other modification it has, as, whether it has the modification of *solidity* or no. As on the other side *substance*, that has the modification of *solidity* is matter, whether it has the modification of *thinking* or no. And, *therefore*, if your Lordship means *by a spiritual, an immaterial substance*, I grant I have not proved, nor, upon my principles, *can it be proved*, your Lordship meaning (as I think you do) *demonstratively proved*, that there is an immaterial substance in us that thinks. Though I presume, from what I have said about the supposition of a system of matter, thinking (which there demonstrates that God is immaterial) will *prove* it in the highest degree probable, that the thinking substance in us is immaterial. But your Lordship thinks probability not enough, and by charging the want of demonstration upon my principles, that the thinking thing in us is immaterial, your Lordship seems to conclude it demonstrable from principles of philosophy."

This elucidation of the passage is exceedingly satisfactory: the inference of the arguments of Locke, being the *highest probability* and *opinion* that the thinking thing in us is immaterial, and the inference of the arguments of the Bishop of Worcester being the *demonstration* and *certainly* that the thinking thing in us is immaterial. The fact is, the philosophy of Locke, like that of Bacon, having "God for its author," was derived from the pure fountain of truth. "*For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on im-*

mortality:" so that what Locke said, "To shew that all the great ends of religion and morality are secured barely by the immortality of the soul, without a *necessary* supposition that the soul is immaterial," he maintained "that immortality may and shall be annexed to that which in its own nature is neither immaterial nor immortal, as the Apostle has expressly declared." After having quoted from the Tusculan Questions and the sixth book of the *Æneid*, he proves that Cicero and Virgil put the same distinction between body and spirit as the writers of the Old and New Testaments had done. "That the one was a gross *compages* that could be felt and handled; and that the other, such as Virgil describes the ghost and soul of Anchises to be." The following elucidates the fact: "*Behold my hands and my feet, that it is I myself: handle me and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me have.*" These arguments respecting the true meaning of the passage which has been here cited, Locke concludes with the following affirmation of his doctrine; which, I conceive, few persons will be hardy or bold enough to attempt to controvert. "Upon my principles," says Locke, "i. e. from the idea of thinking, *we can have a certainty* that there is a thinking substance in us; from hence we have a certainty that there is an *eternal thinking substance*. This thinking substance, which has been from eternity, I have proved to be *immaterial*. This eternal, immaterial, thinking substance, hath put into us a thinking substance, which, whether it be a material or immaterial substance, cannot be infallibly demonstrated from our ideas; though from them it may be *proved, that it is to the HIGHEST DEGREE PROBABLE THAT IT IS IMMATERIAL*. This, in short, my Lord, is what I have to say on this

point." Still modern chemists maintain that nothing but matter can act upon matter; therefore the soul, say they, is material. But Locke has proved, that there is an eternal, immaterial, thinking substance; now this eternal, immaterial, thinking substance creates, supports, and governs all things, material and immaterial: upon this we conclude that an immaterial substance CAN act upon a material substance. Thus the argument of modern chemists respecting materialism, is at one blow annihilated. We need not hesitate then in affirming with Mr. Rennell, that "Notwithstanding all the attempts which have been made to dissolve the connexion, Revelation and science will ever receive a mutual countenance and support from each other. All the labours of philosophic research have illustrated the page of Revelation, and Revelation itself has added strength and solidity to the discoveries of science."* Impressed with these ideas, and not till then, man exerts his intellectual powers to advantage—here his study of philosophy and true theoretic science properly begins: it is here that the lover of wisdom inhales the purest vital air; it is in the regions of unsophisticated truth, that students in every department of scientific research employ their energies to the best possible advantage for themselves and their fellow men.

* *Remarks on Scepticism*, page 131.

CHAP. VII.

Opinion that if Horne Tooke had pursued the same course of reasoning as Locke had done, respecting fundamental doctrines, he would then have been able to answer his own query respecting the substantive and the verb—application of the two preceding chapters to the question of Horne Tooke—none else than the FIRST CAUSE can say I HAVE EXISTENCE IN OR WITH MY ESSENCE—inference and exemplification of the nature of the artificial verb and definition—elucidation of five elementary parts of speech and the use of the article and other restrictives—the use of supernumerary particles when reasoning on the simple proposition:

IT is evident, to me at least, that if Horne Tooke had availed himself of the course of reasoning which had been adopted by Locke, respecting intellect and Revelation, and had he imbibed more accurate notions than it is manifest he did, respecting the *eternal, immutable, and necessary existence*, he would then, possibly, have been enabled to separate the verb from the substantive, in the artificial language of man: he would have seen the fallacy of supposing the existence of “a differential something” in the verb over and above what he conceived to be inherent in the substantive. The truth is, every step which man takes in science, should be done with exceeding humility: by night and by day he should feel himself dependent on the Being who called him into birth; on the Being who supports and incites him forward to action. And, let it be asked, what mighty stretch of thought does this require? *Quòd si et illa cognoscit Deus, quidni et curet?*—is the language of the learned and philosophic Grotius, on the individual government and providence of God. But it is of little consequence to science, that we assent to the truth of any just and incontrovertible

proposition, unless "by industry and patient thought,"* we apply it, and suffer it to influence our judgment in its decisions respecting apparently contrary circumstances. This remark is altogether applicable to science in general, and also to the one grand and fundamental proposition—there is an infinitely wise and perfect Being, who creates, supports, and governs all things. *Unus est, vivus, et verus Deus, aternus, incorporeus, impassibilis, impassibilis, immensæ potentia, sapientia, ac bonitatis, creator et conservator omnium, tum visibilium, tum invisibilium.* "Most important it is," says an eloquent writer, whom I have frequently quoted, "that in every department of philosophy, the mind should be led upward to discern the intimate connexion and absolute dependence of all things upon God: that their beginning should be traced to the causation of his power, and their end to the fulfilment of his will. It was this which added to the researches of Newton, of Bacon, and of Locke, an elevation, a clearness, and a consistency, to which, otherwise, even with the powers of their mighty minds, they could never have attained. They drank deep of the fountain of all truth: they began and they ended in God."†

Applying these remarks to the present purpose, recollecting the truth and fundamental article of belief in our inquiries concerning the nature and philosophy of language, we shall be soon led to an acknowledgment of

* "When I wrote my Treatise about our system," says Sir Isaac Newton, in his letter to Dr. Bentley, "I had an eye upon such principles as might work with considerate men for the belief of a Deity; and nothing can rejoice me more, than to find it useful for that purpose. But if I have done the public any service in this way, it is due to nothing but industry and patient thought."

† *Remarks on Scepticism*, page 9.

the correspondent natures of the substantive, the verb, and its attribute. In this exalted sense the verb is coeval with the noun substantive. *Hoc inde colligitur, quod Deus, ut supra jam dictum est, est id, quod est necessario, sive per se*: but this does not apply to artificial language; because none else than this eternal, immutable, and necessary existence can say I AM. That is, I have existence in or with my essence. *Ἐγώ εἰμι*. It follows, therefore, that every created being, mind, and body, and every sort of matter and motion is an accusative case, governed by some verb corresponding to the notion which we attach to the word *cause* or *create*: which verb, in its exalted signification, is coeval with the substantive, both being concentrated in the one word, or *Λόγος*,—verbum essentiale Dei, sive Christus (Hederico) Dei verbum, imò magis ipse Deus (*Iren*: p. 132, *Waterland*:)—this *Λόγος*, therefore, is the *Ἐγώ εἰμι*. Before Abraham was, I AM.

It is necessarily understood, reasonably and philosophically inferred, that, in artificial language, though the verb *to be* is *neuter*, yet, in relation to the first Cause of all created being and matter, it is *active*. Thus: *ὁ ὢν*, the Being (including under the term the notion of power and might irresistible, perfect knowledge and consummate wisdom, eternity, immutability, and omnipresence, *creative power*, supremacy, independence, and necessary existence) *bes* (*facit ut sit*: i. e. *creates* or *causes to exist*) being (i. e. spiritual and corporeal substance, mind and body—man—and matter and motion.) The Being *bes* being: that is, the almighty and everlasting God *creates* matter and motion, mind and body, and all other spirits and substances: the Almighty *creates* man. *Creates* is the verb *to be* in disguise. To comprehend the full meaning

of what is here advanced, let us make man the subject of the verb, and some other word the predicate: we shall perceive then, that the verb no longer maintains its active power, but becomes neuter. "Man is an animal." Here the part of speech *is*, evidently has neither the force of *creates*, nor indeed that of *exists*; for it is not meant, that man exists, he being an animal, i. e. because he is an animal: nor is it merely meant that man exists, an animal exists. The meaning and force of the verb, *is*, in this instance, indicates it to be a sign of affirmation, to shew that man is not merely a *name*, *nomen*, but that it is a *noun substantive*, *nomen substantivum*, and that something is predicated of man. In pronouncing the sentence, "Man is an animal," *is* assumes no more importance than a particle, for it has no accent, but is joined to the two parts of speech, *an animal*—the three being pronounced as *one word*; viz. *is-an-animal*, with the accent on the antepenultimate syllable. In Greek and Latin, the verb *to be*, used in this sense, is frequently omitted; and in Hebrew it is almost always used exclusively as referring to the ELOHIM. *The Causing Power, or First Cause, causes the second causing power, or motion: i. e. the Almighty causes motion.* Now it is plain, that if the order of the substantives were transposed, the meaning then conveyed would be that of a false proposition;—affirming the doctrine of atheistical philosophy: but, if we say, *motion (or secondary cause) causes health; or, in other words, exercise (or secondary cause) strengthens the constitution:* this is a true proposition. Hence it is perceived, that parts of speech indicative of causes are subjects or nominative cases of verbs, and that the verb, in its *original and most enlarged sense*, is used to signify the *being or state*, the *modification of the state*

and *force* of a cause or an *agent* and an *object*. This simple process explains the nature and construction of artificial language; it is presumed, moreover, that this process discovers, that "the verb is"—*not*—"something more than the substantive;" but that it is a differential sign or part of speech, used to point out the power which one substantive has over another substantive: or, in other words, a verb is a part of speech, which signifies that a thing exists, that it is something more than a mere *name*, that the thing *lives*, that it is a *noun substantive*: the verb indicates, likewise, that something is affirmed of the noun substantive; it points out that a noun substantive acts upon an object or suffers by an agent. *A verb, therefore, is a part of speech which is used in discourse to signify the modification of the state, life, and power, of a noun substantive.*

From these, and some former arguments, it is proved, that the verb arose from the noun substantive; and that the verb is a sign or part of speech to signify the state of the noun substantive. It has been also shewn, that, in communicating primary sensations, we adopt five elementary parts of speech: this adoption, it has appeared, is applicable to all languages, and upon this the first principles of Grammar are uniformly founded. But these elementary parts of speech require *restrictives*, *pointers*, or *markers*, before they can stand for definitive and grammatical sentences: which the following elucidations will clearly demonstrate:—

Harsh sound offends greatly ear.

In this order of words, the subject or cause of the impression, "harsh sound," is conveyed to the mind through the medium of the appropriate organ, and, in communicating to another the effect occasioned, it is

instantly hurried back with types or figures of voice expressive of the whole sensation: still "harsh sound" is a general term; therefore, to render the meaning of the term distinct and particular, a restrictive part of speech is required.

Red ball strikes gently green ball.

In this, as in the former order of words, the subject or cause of the impression being first announced, the action, "strikes," or first part of the effect occasioned, follows; next the manner of the action, "gently," and lastly, the object or accusative of the verb. And here, as before, is clearly required the restrictive part of speech. The same remark will apply to the following examples:—

Delicious peach diffuses powerfully flavour.

Hard ball strikes forcibly hand.

Damask rose scatters agreeably odour.

Every word in these examples is introduced, and placed one after the other in its natural order: and however, in languages of the transpositive idiom, such order may be broken, yet according to the clear construction of the English language, the situation of no one of them, in the whole five examples, could be altered, without materially injuring the picture of each sensation. But, as it has been said, the meaning which is attached to each sentence is general; the use of articles and pronouns, therefore, is essential to clearness and perspicuity.

The distinct use and restrictive power of the article is well explained by Dr. Blair:—"When men had got beyond simple interjections or exclamations of passion," says this elegant writer, "and had begun to communicate their ideas to each other, they would be obliged to assign names to the objects by which they were surrounded. Whichever way he looked, forests and trees

would meet the eye of the beholder. To distinguish the trees by separate names would have been endless. Their common qualities, such as springing from a root, and bearing branches and leaves would suggest a general idea and a general name. The genus, a *tree*, would afterwards be subdivided into its several species of oak, elm, ash, &c. by experience and observation."

"Still, however, only general terms of speech were adopted. For the oak, the elm, and the ash, were names of whole classes of objects, each of which comprehended an immense number of undistinguished individuals. Thus when the terms, man, lion, or tree, were mentioned in conversation, it would not be known which man, lion, or tree was meant, among the multitude comprehended under one name. Hence arose a very useful and curious contrivance for determining the individual object intended, by means of that part of speech called the article."

Although it is not immediately connected with our present purpose, to enter into the discussion of topics blended with etymology, yet I shall not withhold one or two remarks respecting the article and the pronominal adjective or demonstrative pronoun: and the more especially, as it will corroborate the general argument of the noun substantive's being the primitive part of speech.

An is evidently derived from *ane* or *æne*, the Saxon for *one*. Of all the anomalies in English pronunciation, the part of speech *one*, pronounced *oun*, is nearly the greatest: but whether or not we regard the Saxon pronunciation of *æne*, *ân*, as the root of the article *an*, it is very clear, that we can derive this part of speech even from the corrupted *oun*. Thus in vulgar phraseology, "a man is a good 'un or a bad 'un: his action is a good

'un or a bad 'un :'' here *un* is most certainly a contraction of *odun*. The possessives *mine* and *thine*, and also the vulgar *hern* and *theirn*, are unquestionably to be derived from the same source—*u* being afterwards syncopated. And though the *a* in *an* may have descended to us through the obsolete *ane*, (used in North Britain for *one*), still the pronunciation of *an* is as truly the identical articulation of the contracted *un*, as heard in each of the above phrases. Thus, we say *un apple*, pronounced as one word, viz. *unapple*, or *un egg*, *unegg*, and not *an apple*, nor *an egg*, though it is so written.

Accounting for the article *an*, and, at the same time, proving, that it was originally either a noun or an adjective, we can account for the article *a*, independently of the Saxon, upon the same principle as that which governs, in composition, the alteration or elision of the consonants in the Latin *ad*, *ab*, *con*, and *in*. Thus *n* before *m* became altered in the pronunciation to *m*; before *b*, to *b*; and so of the rest of the consonants: or rather the *n* in the article *an* before a consonant was identified with the consonant. Thus: instead of saying *am man*, *ab ball*, &c. that is, articulating the consonant twice, our ancestors adopted, possibly, the articulation of the Latins in their pronunciation of such words as *immitto*; here, though *m* and *t* are written twice, each letter is articulated but once. The same remarks apply to such English words as *committee*; the consonants *m* and *t* are only articulated once; i. e. in articulating the letter *m*, the lips unite once only, and, in articulating *t*, the tongue connects itself once only with the gums. It is presumed that the root of *a* and *an* is clearly seen in the numeral *one*; and this enables us to trace *a* and *an* to a noun or an adjective. They are called articles indefinite,

because they point out the general signification of the substantive to which they are annexed. The article *an* is used before vowels, and before words beginning with *h* mute; the article *a* before consonants, and before the part of speech *one*, the letter *u*, when open, as in the words *use*, *union*, *university*, and before the aspirate *h*, unless the accent of the word be on the second syllable, as *an heroic action*, *an historical account*.

Our article *the* points out and determines how far the signification of the noun or substantive to which it is annexed extends, and is, therefore, called definite. This article closely resembles the demonstrative pronoun *that*: the principal differences in these two parts of speech appear to be these: the pronoun *that* has usually an accent, the article *the* has not: *that*, therefore, may be used without a noun or substantive, *the* cannot. Horne Tooke considers *that* as the past participle, and *the* as the imperative mood of the verb *thean*, to get, to take, to assume: but independently of etymological analysis, *the* and *that* may be reduced to adjectives by opposing them to *a*. "I said *the* hard ball, not *a* hard ball; I said *that* red ball, not *a* red ball."

In the use of the article, the English is superior to the Roman language: which is exemplified in the following instances. "The friend of a king—the friend of the king—a friend of the king." Each of these phrases, says Dr. Blair, has a separate meaning; too obvious to be misunderstood. In Latin, *amicus regis*, is entirely undetermined: it may bear any of the three senses which have been mentioned: and requires other words to ascertain its meaning.* The Greek, *ὁ, ὁ, τοῦ*, corresponds

* Dr. Blair's Lectures.

with our definite article; the absence of it in Greek, signifies, that a noun or substantive is to be of general application. In this respect, the English is superior to the Greek; but the Greek article, as a prefix to the infinitive mood, as a sign to signify its noun-state, is a refinement, which does not occur in our language.

The former five examples of primary sensations may now be altered and restricted thus:

That harsh sound offends greatly the ear.

“The ear:” in this instance, the article has peculiarly a restrictive power; it means, I conceive, *the* or *every* ear, which is perfectly susceptible; or it may mean *the ear of the person speaking*.

The red ball strikes gently the green ball.

This delicious peach diffuses powerfully the flavour.

The hard ball strikes forcibly the hand.

This damask rose scatters agreeably the odour.

Words are the transcripts of ideas: the more strictly these transcriptions adhere to the analogy of thought, the more adequately will the growth of idea be represented. But as the mind, that grand and noble spring of action, is capable of considerable advancement, she is desirous, through the medium of her powers over the body and its organs, to exercise her god-like functions of reason; she is not satisfied with the mere *impressive sensation of single objects*, with the mere utterance of *individual propositions*; but, by a certain *consciousness of sensation* in her faculty, she is desirous of extending them to the use and comfort of her outward frame; and by affording balmy consolations of future emancipation, she suggests the necessity of a dignified deportment.

When we proceed to reason on the simple proposition, the analogous order of words is in some measure broken;

and supernumerary particles of speech are then adopted, to connect and unite words into another form of phraseology ; in which, not only all the operations of the art of reasoning are brought into action ; but, likewise, all the flowers and ornaments of mild and soft persuasion are employed, to delight and amuse the imagination. Though the meaning be complex, the unity of the sentence must be perfect. A simple or known object (after the sensation of it has been made upon the mind through the medium of the appropriate outward organ) has, for expression or communication, its one type or single figure in written characters, called a word : but a complex, strange, or undefined object, has its many types, figures, or words, drawn by the mind from likeness, from comparison, and example.

“ As in the works of nature, no man can properly call a river deep, or a mountain high, without the knowledge of many mountains and many rivers ; so in the productions of genius, nothing can be styled excellent, till it has been compared with other works of the same kind.”

In communicating this form of idea, the English language is furnished with smaller particles of speech, which stand for *relatives, auxiliaries, connectives, conjunctives, and disjunctives*, with *definers* or *markers* ; these are gathered about the nouns, the verbs, and their attributes, to render them analogous to the perception, and easy and familiar to the understanding. It appears to be the general opinion, that almost all the derivations of Horne Tooke are established : with the following affirmation of his theory respecting pronouns, conjunctions, and prepositions, I shall pass over the subject of etymology, recommending to those who are partial to philological study,

and have not hitherto read the work, a careful perusal of the "Diversions of Purley." "All those words which are usually termed pronouns, conjunctions, and prepositions, are the corruptions of nouns or verbs, and are still employed with a sense referrible to that which they bore when in the acknowledged form of nouns and verba." To this I shall merely add, that although pronouns are generally used to avoid the repetition of nouns, they sometimes stand *as* nouns, i. e. *not* to avoid the repetition of nouns: and, in this case, they have a peculiar restrictive power: for example—"He who cannot persuade himself," &c. *he* is accentuated, and has the force of a noun preceded by a definite article, i. e. *the man* who cannot, &c.

To render the communication of an idea easy and familiar to the understanding, words must be properly chosen; and words distributed in suitable order are essential to the beauty and elegance of compound sentences. This seems to be deduced from a general principle of nature; the eye and the ear are fond of uniting such objects and sounds, as shall bear the closest resemblance to each other, and also of placing others at a measured distance, that comparison may be formed, and the value of contradistinction and variety be duly appreciated. Notwithstanding this, our colloquial sentences do not always exemplify this order; and yet we are understood. To account for this circumstance belongs to the topics connected with the Theory of Elocution,* and is perfectly foreign to the object of the present Treatise.

* Vide the Philosophy of Elocution, page 131;—the circumstance is there explained.

CHAP. VIII.

Question, whether or not the English grammar should be formed on the Latin plan—opinions of grammarians respecting the six cases—objections answered—the authors of the Eton Latin Grammar have proceeded upon the supposition that the Latin can be taught in connexion with the English grammar—Latin neuter nouns, &c.—elucidations of the English genitive—accentuation and the union of the parts of speech which stand for the English of Latin nouns—Latin prepositions—tenses of the verb.

IT may be safely affirmed, that the best writers of English, are those scholars who have derived their knowledge of grammar from a study of the dead languages.* In our public schools, and, excepting a very few instances, in our private classical schools, the English grammar is not taught. The pupils of each seminary become gradually acquainted with grammar and the use of their native tongue, from the study of Greek and Latin, and the reading of the best classical English authors. This, however, has not prevented grammarians of talent and celebrity from arranging institutes for the exclusive use of English students; and their motive, every one must allow, is honourable to their feelings, as Englishmen. Nevertheless, we cannot help regretting, that those institutes are not adapted, as much as the genius of our language will admit, to the government and discipline of the Latin tongue. It may be said, that, to a very great extent, the thing is impossible; because the idioms of the

* "The habit of strict and careful analysis, which is formed by the process of judicious instruction in the Greek and Latin languages, is itself a most valuable acquisition, and is an excellent preparative for the exertion of the mental powers, in all other inquiries." * * * * "A correct English style and true delicacy of composition, are hardly ever acquired but by the medium of classical literature."—*Systematic Education*.

two languages, the order of words* and the general construction of sentences, are essentially different. That the languages do not correspond in idiom, every one will allow; but that the leading principles of the grammar of English are different from those of Greek and Latin, is a proposition not so easily to be admitted. But if the idiomatic construction is different, it does not thence follow, that either the difference should be made to appear greater than it really is, or that where there is an actual resemblance, it should be concealed. To the youthful mind, the path towards grammatical accuracy is sufficiently thorny, without rendering it more so. Besides, grammatical analysis, grounded upon the true philosophy of language, is the easiest and best possible mode of teaching the youthful mind to think; the reverse is certain to act as an impediment to the intellectual advancement of those tyros, who, having mastered the principles of any of the English grammars now in use, might have occasion afterwards to apply themselves to the study of Latin and Greek. To one of Dryden's children, "a child of larger growth," a hobbedy-hoy, or a man, who might undertake the study of those languages at an advanced age, the inconvenience would not be so considerable: because the meditative faculties and judgment in him would be alive; and the adult mind is capable of appreciating the merits of philosophical analysis. But to little boys, who, by dint of application, have accomplished, and who pretty well understand the analytical parsing of Dr. Ash, Dr. Lowth, or Mr.

* In English, it is the order of words which frequently distinguishes the grammar of a sentence: viz. "Alexander conquered Darius:" invert the order of the nouns and the grammar of the sentence is changed.

Lindley Murray, it is a serious labour and certainly a great loss of time; because they are now under the necessity of traversing the ground again, and that upon a more difficult and complicated plan.

An English grammar, modelled upon the Latin form, would strengthen the conceptions of those pupils, who are intended to begin the study of the classics at their first entrance in the grammar school; and what refers to these pupils would apply equally to those who might commence their classical studies at a future period. It may be here remarked, that, as there is very little variation of the declensions of nouns and verbs in English, a grammar arranged upon the Latin plan would, of course, be much more easy of comprehension for the very little boy than the Latin grammar itself; where the declensions are of a more complex form. This plan would, I am convinced, be a wholesome preparative to the reading of the Eton, Westminster, or any other Latin grammar. The following remarks of Walker prove that, in this particular, I am not singular in my opinions:—"Almost all our grammars," says this writer, "seem to lean, without necessity, to an exclusion of Latin terms, and Latin forms of construction. This propensity has been observed by a judicious grammarian, who says—'Most of the writers since Dr. Lowth, forming a supposition, perhaps, that the English language hath little concern with the Latin, seem to have departed as much as possible, not only from the rudiments, but the terms made use of in grammars of that tongue; and have chosen to put their materials into any form, rather than suffer them to fall in with the Latin plan. In the distribution of the moods and tenses particularly, there is a remarkable variety; some arrange them in one manner, some in another; some *enlarge*, while

others *diminish* their number. In one grammar a tense is transposed in the same mood; in another, it is transplanted into a different one; and in all, many of the technical terms are changed for others, equally, if not more abstracted and perplexing: and thus a new kind of grammatical language has been invented.'—*Shaw's Grammar; Preface*.—"From this state of the case, which appears to be a very just one," continues Walker, "we may perceive how difficult it is to avoid extremes. Because some of the old grammarians were too fond of the Latin terms, and Latin forms of construction, the moderns have attempted to exclude them altogether; and thus, by avoiding one fault, have fallen into another.

"But it will be naturally demanded, of what use to an English scholar is retaining the Latin terms and forms of construction? It may be answered, that if these terms and forms of construction are as intelligible as any we can substitute in their stead, why should we depart from the ancient and received grammatical language of Europe, without deriving any advantage from the change? If, indeed, the Latin terms and forms of construction were much more difficult than such as must be substituted to supply their place, the objection would be a very strong one: but this is not really the case. In the declension of nouns we must have two cases, and in that of pronouns, three. Where would be the difficulty or embarrassment in extending the cases to six, the number of them in Latin. The answer will be, because we have no such cases in our language, and, therefore, why should we create them? It may be replied, that a case or termination of a noun adds no more to its signification than a preposition prefixed to it; the difficulty

then of adopting these cases is ideal: three more cases would be as easily learned as the two or three we are obliged to adopt; and, by doing so, we speak the general grammatical language of all the scholars in Europe: for it must be observed, that general utility, and not philosophical or abstract propriety, is the great object of grammar, as well as of language.

“What has been observed of the cases of nouns is applicable to the declensions. We are obliged to form nouns into classes according to their several modes of forming their plurals; and as we have five varieties of this formation, where would be the impropriety of calling each of these modes a declension? I greatly mistake, if putting each of these varieties in a table declined with all their cases, will not make a better and more lasting impression of the plurals and genitives of nouns, which are so often confounded, than the short transient way in which they are generally mentioned.

“The moods of verbs in Latin, except the optative, have been generally retained by some of the most respectable English grammarians; notwithstanding the strong reasons which may be brought to prove, that we have no more than one mood in English. To abolish these moods would be certainly to coin our grammar anew; but it is highly probable, that what it might gain by this in metaphysical value, it would lose in general currency.

“It will scarcely be questioned, that for boys who are to have a Latin education, an English grammar in the Latin form would be by far the most eligible. But why, it will be said, should ladies be plagued with Latin terms and forms of construction? Why? it may be again answered, because they are as easily understood as any

other? What difficulty do we avoid by calling the noun or substantive, a name; the adjective, an adnoun or a quality; the verb, an affirmation; and the indeclinable parts of speech, particles? Are the leading state and the following state of the noun, which are very inadequate and erroneous terms, more easily conceived than the nominative and the accusative cases? or is the case of the substantive or personal pronoun, when a question is asked, better apprehended by saying the leading state of the substantive or pronoun follows the affirmation, instead of coming before it? One would think such egregious trifling as this could never have entered into the heads of men of sense. If these improvements then are merely visionary, I know not why ladies are to be instructed by a grammar different from that of men, any more than that they should learn composition by a different system of rhetoric."—*Walker's Grammar; Preface.*

But if there are persons who think, that, for the convenience of students in the classics particularly, our language should be accommodated to the grammar of Greek and Latin, and strenuously contend for an equal number of cases with theirs, there are others who object to the plan *in toto*.

"Though the Greeks and Romans," says the author of 'A Treatise on the Etymology and Syntax of the English Language,' "expressed the different relations by variety of inflexion, which they termed cases, it does not follow, that we are to acknowledge the same number of cases as they had, when these relations are expressed in English, not by inflexions, but by prepositions, or words, significant of these relations. The Latins would not have acknowledged *absque fructu*, without fruit, as forming a seventh case, though they acknowledged

fructu, by fruit, as making an ablative or sixth^e case. And why? Because the latter only was formed by inflexion. For this reason, I consider giving the name of dative case to the combination of words *to a king*, or of ablative case to the expression *from a king* to be a palpable impropriety. Our language knows no such cases; nor would an Englishman, unacquainted with Greek and Latin, ever dream of these cases, though perfectly master of his own language."—*Second Edition*, page 129.

In further support of this latter opinion, it is said, by the compilers of "Systematic Education," that "if *case* mean a *change in the word*, to denote connexion with other words, then the plan of our language cannot be accommodated to that of the Latin: if *of a man*, *to a man*, &c. be considered as cases, there is certainly no reason why the same appellation should not be given to every noun to which a preposition is prefixed, and then we shall have above thirty cases."

The term *case* being derived from *cado*, grammarians affix to it the meaning of *falling*, i. e. say they, the *falling from the nominative*: but if this is the accurate meaning of the term, it follows that in Latin the nominative itself, and the vocative (except that of the second declension, whose nominative ends in *as*) and also the accusative of neuter nouns, &c. are not cases: may not the meaning of the term more accurately be called the *falling out*, the *event* or *accident* of the agent and object, as connected with the verb? This explanation, it is conceived, accords with the notion which grammarians entertain of the term *syntax*, as applied to the construction of a sentence; but the other, i. e. *the falling from the nominative*, accords with the notion which is generally entertained of the term *etymology*, and the formation of

individual parts of speech. But the grammarians, in "Systematic Education," say, that "the variation of our nouns is confined to mark one relation, that of *property* or *possession*; and it is, therefore, with great propriety, called the possessive case. The appellation, genitive case, is sometimes applied to it; but the force of the Greek and Latin genitive is to denote relation in general, though capable of specific application, and is *exactly equivalent to a noun preceded by of*. The possessive case of a noun is not equivalent to the noun preceded by *of*, except where the latter has the specific force of belonging to. It may in all cases be represented by *of* with the noun following; but the latter mode of expression cannot in many instances be represented by the possessive case." For the purpose of ascertaining the value of these objections, let us view them separately. With respect to the variation of our nouns as being confined to mark one relation, viz. that of property or possession, it may be said that in the part of speech, *father's*, is contained the force of two nouns differing in signification, with the sign *of* between them. *Whose advice is it? a father's*. The answer comprehends the second noun, *advice*. *A father's advice*. The answer, therefore, might have been given thus—*The advice of a father*. And this accords with the affirmation of Dr. Crombie, that "The relation which the English genitive most commonly denotes, is that of property or possession."* It has been

* "The nature of the relation, which the genitive expresses," says the same grammarian, "must, in some instances, be collected from the scope of the context; for, in English, as in most other languages, this case frequently involves an ambiguity. When I say, 'neither life nor death shall separate us from the love of God,' it may mean, either from the love which we owe to God, or the love which he bears to us; for God's *love* may denote either the relation which the affection bears to its subject, or that which it bears to its object. If the latter be the meaning intended, the ambiguity may be prevented by saying, 'love to God.'

remarked by the late Walker (*Grammar*: page 10) "that the double genitive is an advantage peculiar to our language." But in this, it seems, he was mistaken: the German language has this advantage. "The Latins," says Walker, "can only say, *corona regis*,* and the French, *la couronne du roi*; while the English can say, either *the king's crown*, or *the crown of the king*." The Germans, also, can say, *Des Königs Krone*, or *Die Krone des Königs*. "Nor is the double genitive," continues Walker, a mere idle variety; for it not unfrequently indicates a very different relation of one thing to another. Thus, *the king's picture* may mean either his property or

"An ambiguity likewise arises from it, as expressing either the relation of the effect to its cause, or that of the accident to its subject. 'A little after the reformation of Luther,' says Swift. This may import either the change produced by Luther, or a change produced in him. The latter indeed is properly the meaning, though not that which was intended by the author. He should have said, 'the reformation by Luther.' It is clear, therefore, that the relation expressed by the genitive, is not uniformly the same, that the phrase may be interpreted either in an active or passive sense. *Amor Dei* denotes either *amor quo Deus amat*, or *quo Deus amatur*.—*Reformatio Lutheri*, either *qua reformat*, or *qua reformatus est*. *Injuria patris, desiderium amici*, with many other examples, which might be produced, have either an active or passive sense: ἡ δὲ ἀνὰ τὴν ῥῆσιν, *l'amore di Dio, l'ameur de Dieu*, severally involve the same ambiguity with 'the love of God.' The real import must be collected, not from the expression, but the context."—*Rev. Dr. Crombie's Treatise on Etymology and Syntax*, &c. page 45.

* The Latins might have used one of their possessive adjectives: "*Corona regia*." Thus Ovid—

Nomine in Hectoreo pallida semper eram—

I was always pale at Hector's name, or the name of Hector.

This construction is very frequent among the poets; it does not, however, invalidate the remark of Walker. *Corona Regia*, strictly speaking, means *kingly-crown*, and "*Nomine in Hectoreo*" means, *at the Hector-name*, or the *Hectorean name*. Thus, in English, we say, on a *spring-morning*, or *spring's morning*, or *morning of spring*;—at the *cottage-door*; i. e. the *cottage's door*, or the *door of the cottage*. This procedure proves, that we have the possessive adjective besides the double genitive, mentioned by Walker. *Vide* page 66 of this Treatise.

his likeness; but, *the picture of the king* can mean only the likeness of the king."

With respect to the *general* force and relationship of the Greek and Latin genitive, it may be affirmed, that all individual parts of speech have general relations and significations; therefore, *magistri*, independently of any other part of speech, carries with it a general signification; but it is to be added, that *magistri*, and every other genitive (including under the term the Greek appellation, Πρώτης γενική) is always used in discourse in connexion with another noun, either expressed or understood; consequently, the genitive in Latin, as in English, is capable of specific application. The opinion that the Greek and Latin genitive is exactly equivalent to a noun in English, preceded by *of*, appears to be incorrect. Unless *of* be immediately preceded by another substantive of different meaning, expressed or understood, it has not the force of a Latin genitive. A single sentence will prove it. *I spoke of a master*; that is, the ablative *de*, *of* or *concerning* a master: *de magistro*. In this instance, therefore, *of a master* is not equivalent to the Greek and Latin genitive.

Independently of this inaccurate application of the preposition *of*, grammarians, in general, seem to have entertained but a very erroneous notion of the English genitive. They have found it difficult to trace always the common relation of *belonging* between one noun and another, and have hence concluded that the *Latin genitive-relation* of *belonging* does not actually exist in our language. The difficulty, I conceive, would, in a great measure, be removed, were we to attend more closely to the procedure of language, and to observe its changes as corresponding with the progress and modification of

thought. Let us conceive two nouns of different significations, not separated by the sign *of*; as *the cottage door*: the former has assumed the nature of an adjective; but if these words were turned into Latin, the English adjective noun would be expressed by a noun in the genitive case: *ostium casæ*. In Latin, there is no adjective to correspond with the English word which has assumed the nature of an adjective. The procedure proves, that an English noun, followed immediately by another noun of different signification, is exactly equivalent to a Latin genitive. *The cottage door* means, therefore, *the cottage's door*, or *the door of the cottage*. *A spring morning* signifies *a morning of spring*, or *a spring's morning*: *an autumn morning* signifies *a morning of autumn*, or *autumn's morning*. *Autumn's morning*, and *spring's morning*, sound harshly; whereas the same words, *s* and the apostrophe being omitted, do not have the same effect; *an autumn morning*, *a spring morning*. *Winter's morning* and *summer's morning* are familiar to the ear; which prove the procedure of language, in this particular, to be what has been here stated. The former of two nouns not separated by the sign *of*, as *the cottage door*, was, without doubt, originally of the genitive or possessive case, with an apostrophe and *s* prefixed.* Which or whose door is this? the cottage's, i. e. the cottage's door, or cottage door. According to etymologists, if the preposition *of* is derived from the Anglo-Saxon substantive *afora*, signifying offspring, &c. it is easy to conceive, that *of*, in all phrases like the following, implies the meaning of *having*, *possessing*, *exemplifying*, *exhibiting*, &c. Thus: "A man of honourable con-

* It might, perhaps, be more correct to say, the ancient Saxon genitive termination *es*, i. e. without an apostrophe.

duct." This phrase signifies "A man exemplifying or exhibiting honourable conduct." Here *honourable* is derived from the noun *honour*, and *exemplifying* or *exhibiting* is a translated form of *having* or *possessing*, and is of a more active signification than the primitive *afora* or *offspring*. "The man exhibits honourable actions:" i. e. the man, having, or possessing honour (honourable feeling) exhibits the actions of honour, or honourable actions. The truth is, the process of language is exceedingly simple; and may be resolved upon very easy principles: if, therefore, we wish to overcome difficulties, we must proceed upon first principles, and be content to reason like children.

Now let us transcribe what the authors of the Eton Grammar have said of Latin nouns, in reference to those in English. "The nominative case cometh before the verb, and answereth to the question *who?* or *what?* as *who teaches?* *Magister docet*, the master teaches." Here we perceive, that a direct application of the English grammar, upon the Latin plan, is made; and it must appear to every one, that the reference is just. Hence the propriety of the juvenile student's studying the English grammar as preparatory to that of the Latin. "The genitive case is known by the sign *of*, and answereth to the question *whose?* or *whereof?* as *whose learning?* *doctrina magistri*, the learning of the master, or the master's learning." The definition of the genitive is not so accurate as its exemplification. It ought to have been expressed thus: The genitive case is known by the sign *of* placed between two substantives, in English, of different significations, the latter of which when it answers to the question *whose*, &c. The definition would then correspond with, *Quam duo substantiva diversæ*

significationis, &c. "The dative case," says the Eton Grammar, "is known by the signs *to* or *for*, and answereth to the question *to whom?* or *to* or *for what?* as *to whom do I give the book?* *Do librum magistro*, I give the book *to* the master." Here again it is presumed, that the student knows something of the English grammar: and the resemblance between the two languages is signified: nor can the resemblance be disputed: "The accusative followeth the verb, and answereth to the question *whom?* or *what?* *whom do you love?* *Amo magistrum*, I love the master." Here the authors of the Eton Grammar have endeavoured to shew the analogy which subsists between the English part of speech *master*, in point of *meaning* or *power*, and *magistrum*. In English, the construction of the sentence is the only guide to distinguish the accusative from the nominative noun: and *this same remark applies to all neuter Latin nouns, singular and plural, and the plurals of the third and fourth declensions*, &c. If case, therefore, should be said to mean "the falling off from the nominative," certainly these Latin accusatives are not cases.

"The vocative case is known by calling or speaking to; as *O magister*, O master." Here the two languages are completely analogous. "The ablative is known by prepositions, expressed or understood, serving to the ablative case; as *de magistro*, of the master; *coram magistro*, before the master." "Also the prepositions *in*, *with*, *from*, *by*; and the word *than*, after the comparative degree, are signs of the ablative case."*

* By availing each of their native tongue as a vehicle to the Latin, Priscian taught Latin to the Greeks, and Alvarus to the Italians. And though we have never proceeded *systematically* upon this plan with our children, yet that we should do so, may appear, not only from the ex-

It must appear exceedingly evident, I conceive, to those who will take the trouble of examining thoroughly the plan of the Eton Grammar, that the authors have proceeded upon the supposition, that the Latin language can be taught in connexion with the English: and upon this principle the author of every Latin grammar has proceeded. The question, therefore, is—whether it is more philosophical, and more convenient for the classical student, that certain verbs should be said to govern nouns by the force of prepositions, or whether those nouns should be said to be governed entirely by prepositions. With regard to the prepositions, which the Eton Grammar affirms to be the signs of the respective cases, not one of them has an accent; and, though each of them on paper stands detached, every one of these prepositions is joined to the noun, and is actually pronounced with the article and the noun as *one word*. This will be best understood by a paradigm.

Magister,	Amàster.	Magistri, .	Masters.
Magistri,	Ofamàster.	Magistorum,	Ofmasters, &c.
Magistro,	Toamàster.	N.B. In the plural, nouns are not declined with the indefinite article: but those which are declined with the definite article, retain it in the plural.	
Magistrum,	Amàster.		
Magister,	Omàster.		
Magistro,	Byamàster.		

In pronouncing the declensions, both men and boys are accustomed (whether correctly or not, it is not requisite here to determine) to accentuate those syllables

traordinary aptitude of our *particles* to the Latin governments, but more especially from this consideration, that whether we will deign professedly to teach them through the medium of our particles or no, it is actually through that medium we do teach them; for during the early years of their tuition they can learn in no other way: With Lilly's three hundred Rules and Exceptions upon their tongue, it is to and by our particles alone they make *mental* application.—*Rev. Richard Lyne's Latin Grammar; Preface.*

which mark the contradistinctions of cases: they say *magistrè*, *magistrò*, &c. and *òf* a master, *tò* a master, &c.; when they read sentences, they accentuate differently. In speaking and reading English, we say—"Follow | the advice | of a màster." It is evident here, that the article is joined to *advice*, that the preposition and article are joined to *master*, and also, that the verb and nouns only have accents. "I gáve it | to a màster." The same remarks apply again.

The accusative and nominative are alike, and have been before explained. The vocative, leaving out the *o*, is different from the nominative, because it has not an article.

And thus stands the accentuation of the ablative. "It was spoken | by a màster."

All the plurals might of course be exemplified in the same way.

Possibly, the reader will anticipate what I am now going to advance: if custom would authorise the joining of English prepositions to nouns, on paper, in the way which I have shewn them to be actually joined by the voice in pronunciation and in reading, then the analogy between English and Latin nouns would be more easily recognized: it would be plainly understood, that the inflexions of English nouns are at the beginning of them; those of the Latin nouns, at the end. Instead, therefore, of saying *a master of*, or *a master to*, corresponding with the order of the inflexion in Latin nouns, we say *òf a master*, *tò a master*, &c. This candidly acknowledged to be the true state of the question, there is no plausible reason remaining, why the English grammar, as far as nouns are concerned, should not be systematized according to the Eton plan. With respect to the thirty

cases corresponding to the number of prepositions, mentioned by the objectors, the same argument would apply to the Latin. The following prepositions are succeeded by the Latin accusative, including of course all *neuter nouns*, &c. and these are like the nominative. *Ad, adversum, adversus, ante, apud, circa, circum, circiter, cis, citra, contra, erga, extra, infra, inter, intra, iuxta, ob, penes, per, pone, post, præter, prope, præter, secundum, secus, supra, trans, versus, ultra, usque.* In Latin, these are affirmed to govern a neuter accusative, and the accusative plural of the third and fourth declensions; why should they not be permitted to have the like power in the government of English accusatives? The same may be remarked of those prepositions which have an ablative case after them. *A, ab, abs, absque, coram, cum, de, e, ex, palam, præ, pro, sine, tenus,* and also of those which serve to both cases. *Clam, in* for *into*, *in* for *in* only, *sub, subter, super.* My reason for citing the prepositions at length is to shew that the argument against the appellation of case, on account of the number of them, is not more objectionable in English than in Latin: and I cannot perceive any reasonable objection, why we should admit that nouns in English are governed in particular cases by the assistance or force of these prepositions. In the list of the Latin prepositions may be seen some few, which require two or three parts of speech to English them. *Ob, because of, penes, in the power of, prope, near to, secundum, according to, trans, on the farther side, ex, out of, tenus, up to, as far as, clam, unknown to.* It is evident that every one of these phrases has the force of a preposition; and, also, that most of them should, in English, be parsed as prepositions; viz. *because of,*

near to, according to, out of, as far as*—assisting the verb in the government of either the accusative or ablative case.

To what has been already said respecting the verb, little needs be added. It is generally admitted, that with the help of auxiliaries, or signs of tenses, the English verb corresponds pretty closely with the Latin. The imperative, strictly speaking, has only one person; and here the English language, most unquestionably, has an advantage over the Greek and Latin. "Let me go, or let thou me to go; go, or go thou; let him go, or let thou him to go; let us go, or let ye us to go; go, or go yé; let them go, or let ye them to go."

Every person of a verb in Latin, of any tense and mood, requires in English two or more parts of speech to express its meaning, and yet these English parts of speech are joined together in pronunciation, and have only one accent. Thus, *monui* may signify, *I have advised him*; representing to us four separate English parts of speech; but in pronouncing them, the parts of speech are united, and are recognized by the ear as one word, with the accent on the penultimate syllable. *I have advised him*. In parsing, therefore, the verb of this sentence, *I have advised him*, it would not be inconvenient, I conceive, to call *have* a sign of the *preter* or *perfect* tense, and "*have advised*," taken together, a verb. The same remarks are applicable to all the rest of the persons and tenses of English verbs.

With regard to the construction of sentences, there are certain rules which hold good in all languages.

* "*According to*," will be found in Johnson's Dictionary as a preposition.

"The verb agrees with its nominative case in number and person: when two verbs come together, the latter is in the infinitive mood: the verb *to be* has the same case after it that goes before it: the relative agrees with the antecedent in gender, number, and person;—and a few others. These rules, which are in all languages, and in the nature of things, are very different from that government of words peculiar to the Greek and Latin languages; in the former of which a neuter, and sometimes a masculine or feminine substantive in the plural number, requires a verb singular; and in the latter, not only adjectives, but adverbs and interjections govern the cases of nouns. The case absolute in the Latin is the ablative; in the Greek, the genitive; and in English, the nominative. It would, therefore, be the height of absurdity to follow the syntax of these languages, any farther than they follow the syntax of all other languages; and in these, if we adopt the same terms, it is because they are more universally known than any other." These outlines the author* did not judiciously fill up: but the deficiencies might be easily supplied by the aid of the valuable syntax and remarks of the Rev. Dr. Crombie.

Most persons, it is presumed, will be ready to admit, that, in the lower schools, where the classics are not studied by the pupils, the arrangement of our present English grammars will answer most common purposes; and, as far as they proceed, be more easy of comprehension than one formed upon the plan of the Eton Latin Grammar. But it is also to be admitted, that the term "easy" is only of comparative signification; for it has not been presumed, that so philosophic a know-

* Walker.

ledge of language can be obtained by the plan of Dr. Ash, Dr. Lowth, or Mr. L. Murray, as by the plan of that which has been just named. The present mode of teaching the grammar of our vernacular language is easy in the same degree, as the present method of teaching Latin prosody is easy; viz. the custom of pronouncing the penultimate vowel long of all Latin words of two syllables, and one consonant in the middle, without any regard to quantity; and the custom of pronouncing the antepenultimate vowel short of all Latin words of three syllables, followed by a single consonant, without any regard to quantity: thus, the genitive singular of *rex*, and the second person singular of the present tense of *Rego*, are both pronounced alike: i. e. long; *Rēgis*: though every little boy in the second form is able to tell the master, that the penultimate vowel of the former is long, and that of the latter is short: and on the other hand, the antepenultimate vowel of *regibus* is pronounced exactly the same as that of the infinitive of *rego*, though the vowel in *rēgibus* is long, and that in *rēgere* is short. These anomalous methods of pronouncing the penultimate and antepenultimate vowels, succeeded by one consonant, are almost uniformly adopted and patronized in our public schools; and thus the eye and the ear are constantly at variance.* It is repeated that the present method of teaching English grammar is easy in the same degree as the present method of teaching Latin prosody is easy; either is only of comparative utility.

* A reformation in this particular is now being effected in some of our schools. I believe I am authorised in saying, that it receives the powerful sanction of Dr. Russell, head master of the Charter-House.

CHAP. IX.

Sentences—the opinion that every sentence is a factitious word controverted—Burke—the unity essential to a thinking being is not requisite to the operations of a thinking being—ellipsis of the verb “to be”—sentences of childhood—opinion that the imperatives, *ge, hark,* &c. are virtual sentences—this opinion controverted—order of words analogous to the operations of intellect—elucidations—and conclusion of the argument.

HERE we might proceed to discuss other subjects, and to reflect upon the changes and diversities of language; but, prior to this, it seems requisite to say a few words concerning the construction of sentences as connected with the progress of intellect.

In a work which is already before the public, I have adopted the analytical arrangement of the compact and loose sentences of Walker; from what has been advanced in this Treatise, it will be seen that I have not had occasion to alter the opinion. The conceptions, which my inquiries have led me to adopt respecting language, still continue to be precisely the same as those of Walker, and, consequently, different from the opinions of any writer, “whose views of the nature of language” have disposed him to regard every sentence as forming “a *factitious word*.” In unison with this latter opinion, I have lately read, “that if language, in its progress towards perfection, could have proceeded on the pattern of nature, it must have invented a word for every sentiment that was to be expressed, which word would have been proper for that sentiment, and for none other.” On another occasion, the same writer, I believe, maintains that “the words composing any sentence are on the footing of letters composing a word. The two cases

would indeed be exactly parallel," says the writer, "were every person allowed to follow his own fancy in the spelling of words; but the rules of orthography are fixed, and they alone spell correctly, who spell in one particular way. But in the spelling of his thoughts by words, every person is allowed to follow his own method." This is fortunate: but if I might be permitted to propose a question, I should ask "whose method else could he follow?" Hortensius would tell us that few can examine into the nature of their thoughts; and that even in the use of instituted language, men frequently make use of words without any clear, correspondent ideas attached to them: disputation or confusion is the result. But it will be retorted, that "an apparatus that requires and implies so much art in the management, little accords, on many occasions, with the fervour and rapidity of our thoughts. If the passion is violent, we give it vent in short abrupt sentences, which, from constant use, suggest themselves as readily as the language of nature; still they are far from being adequate to our purpose, because they exhibit the circumstances by which we are influenced only by starts and fits; we want the ONE word that shall lay bare the mind in a moment; but it cannot be found, and we have only to avail ourselves of the best means in our power to supply its place." It is difficult to conceive, how, upon such a notion of language and thought as these extracts convey, a *theory of elocution* should have been formed: that such an attempt, however, has been made, will appear from the following compendium:—"A sentence, in point of expression, is but a single word, the parts of which it is composed being merely grammatical divisions, more or less closely connected in this respect, but not at all related to any

correspondent division in the *thought*, which, in their united capacity, they serve to express. As to pronunciation, therefore, we may expect that a sentence will be liable to the same affections as a single, independent word, and, making the necessary allowances of length, this will be found *universally* the case." Admitting, for one moment, the former theory to be sound, an application of it to the rules of pronunciation and delivery, is altogether out of the question. There is not, in my opinion, the slightest analogy whatever between the pronunciation or expression of an individual part of speech, and the various characters of the voice, its respirations, breaks, and pauses, in the utterance of a sentence: and the truth of this position more strongly appears, when we take into consideration the nature of some of the prominent tropes and figures in rhetoric as blended with the oratorical delivery of a sentence. A discussion of these points, however, does not belong to the object of this Treatise; at present I shall merely confine myself to the former theory, promising to recur to the points connected with elocution at some future period.

The five elementary parts of speech clearly elucidate the essential principles of grammar. But these elements, placed in their analogous order, relate only to simple thoughts, and simple individual propositions. It has been shewn, that when we proceed to reason on the simple proposition, the order of words is, in some measure, broken; and supernumerary particles are then adopted, to connect and unite words into another form of phraseology: of which parts of speech, the adjective, the substantive, and the verb, grammarians regulate and form into sentences, by the two general rules of concord and government. These, I have endeavoured to prove,

may, with the greatest propriety, be modelled on the prominent principles of the Eton Latin Grammar.

Each sort of sentence, strictly speaking, conveys only one thought: but the procedure of language in expressing thought is exceedingly varied. "A man seldom detects a pleasing error." We perceive, that the example, placed within the signs of quotation, conveys to the mind but *one thought*. If the example be altered thus: "A man *never* detects a pleasing error," the logical deduction of the proposition appears false or doubtful, and the qualifying clause, "till reflexion operates," is requisite to be added, that the thought may be rendered just and true. The following example conveys one thought only, but two efforts of the mind are requisite to complete it. "There is a vigilance of observation, and accuracy of distinction, which books and precepts cannot confer; and from this, almost all original and native excellence proceeds." The construction may be so altered, as shall enable one effort of the mind to comprehend and complete the whole sentence. "Almost all original and native excellence proceeds from a certain vigilance of observation and accuracy of distinction, which books and precepts cannot confer." These two or three examples prove how very various is the procedure of language in the communication of thought. "There are but few men," says the writer Hortensius,* "who are masters of the tongue they daily use, and fewer still who can give a rational account of their own thoughts: they cannot examine into the nature of their thoughts, for it is not in their power to unravel them. Hence the frequent use they make of words without any

* Deinology: or the Union of Reason and Elegance; by Hortensius; page 166: published 1769, by Robinson and Co.

clear, correspondent ideas attached to them; or if they have a clear idea of an object, they are at a loss for the true term that expresses it. Their meaning is guessed at and generally mistaken; disputation ensues, and the result is confusion." And yet another writer conceives, that our thoughts are of so determined a character, as that the natural expression of any individual thought is capable of being identified with the utterance of a single word. But strange as it may probably appear to an individual entertaining such a doctrine, the author of the *Sublime and Beautiful* was of opinion, "that we are often at a loss to know what ideas we have of things, or whether we have any ideas at all upon some subjects." It is nevertheless to be admitted, that every separate word, as it stands united with others in a sentence, does not of itself convey a definite meaning. Nor do the five elementary parts of speech, used collectively and in their analogous order, convey a definite signification: they require restrictive particles and relatives to limit the sum total of thought. This also was well understood by Burke: and he expressed himself in such a manner, that few could fail of interpreting his meaning:—"It is impossible," says he, "in the rapidity and quick succession of words in conversation, to have ideas both of the sound of the word, and of the thing represented; besides, some words, expressing real essences, are so mixed with others of a general and nominal import, that it is impracticable to jump from sense to thought, from particulars to generals, from things to words, in such a manner as to answer the purposes of life: nor is it necessary that we should." Part 5, sec. 5, *SUBLIME and BEAUTIFUL*.—And yet, with great judgment, the same writer has affirmed, "that it is hard to repeat certain words, though

owned by themselves unoperative, without being in some degree affected, especially if a warm and affecting voice accompanies them; as suppose *wise, valiant, generous, good, and great*. These words, by having no application, ought to be unoperative; but when words commonly sacred to great occasions are used, we are affected by them, even without the occasion. When words, which have been generally so applied, are put together without any rational view, or in such a manner, that they do not rightly agree with each other, the style is called bombast. And it requires, in several cases, much good sense and experience to be guarded against the force of such language; for when propriety is neglected, a greater number of these affecting words may be taken into the service, and a greater variety may be indulged in combining them." **SUBLIME and BEAUTIFUL**, part the 5th, sec. 3.

The soul of man is essentially indivisible; and although it is endued with distinct faculties, yet, as we have before said, there is no absolute division in the soul itself, for it is the whole soul that wills, thinks, or remembers. "No man," says the author of the *Remarks on Scepticism*, "can think in two separate places at the same time; nor again, is his consciousness made up of a number of separate consciousnesses; as the solidity, the colour, and motion of the whole body is made up of the distinct solidities, colours, and motions of its parts." *Remarks on Scepticism*, page 89.—The unity which is essential to a thinking being, forms a very principal argument against the absurd doctrines of materialism. But this unity is not essentially requisite to the **OPERATIONS** of a thinking being. We are not acquainted with the precise boundaries of the operations of intellect; neither

do we know at all times, the actual limits nor extensiveness of any one of our individual thoughts. The fact is, generally speaking, we hardly know what our thoughts are; at least, all that we know of them is by parts; and if we happen to be blinded by either appetite or passion, we know not even the good or evil tendency of any one particular thought. If these premises be granted, it will then unquestionably follow, that the vocal expression of intellect must be composed of parts, to correspond with the progress and completion of thought, and that a single word would be altogether inadequate for the purpose. But it has been already said that the mere naming of an object amounts to no one part of intellect or thought, or the expression of it; the thing must be said to live; it must be affirmed to have or have not existence; language must give or deny it being, acting, or sufferance; and it is not in the power of one single external sign to effect this: further, to effect the most simple purposes of communication, another sign must be employed, either expressed or understood. It is to be here noticed, that the writer whose singular opinions I am now opposing, affirms, that "the VERB is itself a SENTENCE, as are the imperatives *go, come, forbear, hark! hark!*" &c. "that it is the only part of speech which is capable, on occasion, of being by itself a word" (sentence). Without resting on the authority of grammarians, who say, that the imperative mood is nothing more nor less than the simple verbal *name*, unattended with the inference of affirmation—and that if we say to a servant "*Bread, or bring some bread,*" nothing more is intended than that we wish him to bring us bread,—the object only being named in the first instance, and the name of the action as well as the object, in the second;—

I say, without resting on nice philological distinctions, it is merely requisite to state, that the individual parts of speech, *bread!* as in the above instance, *silence!* *order!* &c. and vocative cases, especially as in calling a servant, *Thomas!* *John!* &c. are all as much sentences as the imperatives *go, come, &c.* "In order to suit the purposes of speech, the verb," it is said, "is made capable of being less comprehensive, and instead of being itself a sentence, it can, when necessary, be a mere sign to indicate a sentence." In the examples, "*George is tall,* *George is walking,* the artificial verb," it is added, "merely indicates that a thought or judgment is expressed; for the phrases *tall George* and *George walking,* sufficiently designate the objects conceived, and it is only the absence of the artificial verb, that forbids them to be understood as sentences." The general tenour of this remark applies only to the construction of English; and not to the nature and philosophy of language in general. It may, notwithstanding, be remarked, that *tall George* and *George walking* are not analogous terms; *WALKING George* would be analogous, in construction, to the term *TALL George*. *Tall George* is a mere name, and nothing else; but *George WALKING*, I apprehend, is something more. The participial adjective following the noun, the order is not the English order. Something appears to be affirmed of George, viz. that he is *walking*. Little children uniformly leave out the verb in their first attempts to unite words in a sentence. "*George walking, mamma.*" and this sentence, I conceive, every parent would understand. This exactly accords with the idiomatic construction of Greek and Latin, and particularly with that of the Hebrew language. Indeed, as the compilers of Systematic Education have remarked,

“The connecting link in language needs not always be stated. In the infancy of language it could not exist: and in the language of childhood it does not exist. Words are joined together, and it is easily understood, that the corresponding ideas are connected in the mind. ‘Mother milk good,’ would surely be understood by any one; and, in similar cases, depending upon the case of inference, the ancient writers left it to the mind of the reader to form it for himself.” But it is asserted, that “without the aid of a verb, the WORD (*sentence*) cannot be formed,” and that the verb is “the only part of speech which is capable, on occasion, of being by itself a WORD” (*sentence*). “*Mr. Speaker! My Lord and Gentlemen of the Jury!*” Each of these phrases is elliptical, and each may be called a virtual sentence—more so, I am inclined to think, than the imperatives, *go, come, &c.* Sentences of this sort are exceedingly common in the Hebrew construction. The scholar needs not be told, that the ellipsis of the verb *to be* occurs continually in the Greek and Latin languages: in the Hebrew writings it is observable almost in every verse. “Howl, O gate, cry, O city; thou whole Palestina (*art*) dissolved; for there shall come from the north a smoke, and none (*shall be*) alone in his appointed times.” Isaiah 14.—“In God (*is*) my salvation and my glory; the rock of my strength (*and*) my refuge (*is*) in God. Trust in him at all times; ye people, pour out your heart before him: God (*is*) a refuge for us. Surely men of low degree (*are*) vanity, (*and*) men of high degree (*are*) a lie: to be laid in the balance, they (*are*) altogether (*lighter*) than vanity.” Ps. 62.—But there are ellipses in the sacred writings more striking than these: viz. as in the first four verses of the *Proverbs*, and Psalm 109 and 4th verse.

“ The Proverbs of Solomon, the son of David, king of Israel;

To know wisdom and instruction, to perceive the words of understanding;

To receive the instruction of wisdom, justice, and judgment, and equity;

To give subtilty to the simple, to the young man knowledge and discretion.”

In these four verses the principal verb or sign of affirmation is not, even in our translation, expressed, but understood. The ellipsis in the fourth verse of the 109th Psalm is exceedingly striking:—“ I (*give myself unto*) prayer.”

We have before stated, that every separate word, as it stands connected with others in a sentence, does not of itself convey a definite meaning; but it is not to be understood, that the general order of each word in a sentence is dissimilar to the order and progress of every operation or act in the thought; for this would be to destroy all analogy whatever, and all grammatical construction. Still, possibly, it may be again said, that a thought is *one*; that there is no division in a thought, nor is a thought capable of being divided. What, therefore, cannot be divided, must not be said to have parts. It is one. Without recurring to what has been before advanced on the unity of a thinking being, and, on the other hand, on our total incompetency oftentimes to examine into the nature of our thoughts, we will endeavour to prove at once, by actual experiment, that all which we can know of the growth and progress of the mind, is by calmly attending to its incessant operations while it is developing and expressing the limits or extensiveness of an individual thought, as set forth in a

sentence. Let us begin with the following example:—
 “The men who can be charged with the fewest failings,
 are generally most ready to make allowances for them.”
 That the inference intended to be drawn from this as-
 semblage of words may be perfectly understood, we will
 attach a definite signification to the part of speech
 “*failings*,” limiting the meaning of it to that of *virtue*.
 This sentence then, so restricted, is acknowledged to
 express the precise and actual thought of the speaker.
 Now, then, let us imagine the speaker as beginning to
 express this actual thought, this thought not to be di-
 vided; this thought which positively exists in his mind
 at the moment of commencing the sentence. “The
 men who can be charged with the fewest failings”—at
 the very instant of pronouncing the part of speech
 “*failings*,” the thought of the speaker, which, in the
 first instance, was limited, now becomes general; i. e.
failings either with respect to abilities or virtue: the sen-
 tence, or expression of the thought, now stands thus:—
 “The men who can be charged with the fewest failings,
 either with respect to abilities or virtue, are generally
 most ready to make allowances for them.” As another
 example, let us take the following sentence:—

“Criticism, though dignified from the earliest ages by
 the labours of men eminent for knowledge and sagacity,
 and since the revival of polite literature, the favourite
 study of European scholars, has not yet attained the
 certainty and stability of science.” The substance of
 the original thought is evidently contained in the follow-
 ing reduced form:—“Criticism has not yet attained the
 certainty and stability of science.” But at the instant of
 pronouncing the word “*criticism*,” the thought of the
 speaker is augmented; “though dignified from the

earliest ages by the labours of men eminent for knowledge and sagacity:" and in pronouncing the words "*earliest ages*," or some word in the latter part of the same clause, the succeeding clause is suggested to the speaker's mind: viz. "and since the revival of polite literature, the favourite study of European scholars." The following arrangement of words in the writings of Lord Shaftsbury, will afford us a striking instance of the progress of intellect during the utterance of a sentence. The writer is giving advice to an author; and is speaking of modern poets as compared with the ancient. "If they secretly advise, and give instruction, they may be esteemed the best and most honourable among men." We will suppose, as before, that at the utterance of the first syllable, these words convey the sum total of a thought existing in the speaker's mind. But the operations of thought are swift, like lightning: during the utterance of the unaccentuated syllable, "if," the clause, "*while they profess only to please*," suggests itself. "If, while they profess only to please, they secretly advise, and give instruction, they may"—*here, as before, the thought receives fresh modification*, "now, perhaps, as well as formerly be esteemed"—*The adverbial phrase*, "with justice," *now occurs to the speaker's mind*—"with justice, the best and most honourable among authors." The sentence, expressive of the thought, modified and completed, stands thus:

"If, while they profess only to please, they secretly advise, and give instruction, they may, now, perhaps, as well as formerly, be esteemed, with justice, the best and most honourable among authors."

Dr. Blair pronounces this to be a well-constructed sentence, for the words seem to flow in a very perspi-

cuous and natural order: the sentence contains a great many circumstances and adverbs, says Dr. Blair, which are necessary to qualify the meaning; *only, secretly, as well, perhaps, now, with justice, formerly*; yet these are placed with so much art, as neither to embarrass nor weaken the sentence; while that which is the capital object in it, viz. "Poets being justly esteemed the best and most honourable among authors," comes out clear and detached, and possesses its proper place.

Let us take another sentence, and one of different construction:

" Remember well,
The noble lessons by affliction taught :
Preserve the quick humanity it gives,
The pitying social sense of human weakness ;
Yet keep thy generous fortitude entire,
The manly heart, that to another's woe
Is tender as superior to its own."

This sentence may be viewed either as presenting one entire picture of the speaker's mind, at the time when he commenced the sentence, or as exhibiting the progress of his mind as the sentence proceeds. In the former instance, the members of the sentence would be completely united, and this would be indicated by the speaker's utterance: that is to say, the third and fourth lines would be pronounced as a concession, and the fifth line as the assertion following it. According to this method of interpreting the meaning of the sentence, the voice would seem to connect the parts before and after the concession and assertion, with as much perspicuity as though the construction had been assisted by something like the following intervening parts of speech:—

"Remember well,

The noble lessons by affliction taught :

(that is, while you)

Preserve the quick humanity it gives,

The pitying, social sense of human weakness :

Yet (remember to) keep thy generous fortitude entire,

(because) The manly heart, that to another's woe

Is tender as superior to its own."

But if the sentence be viewed as exhibiting the progress and modification of the speaker's mind as he proceeds in the utterance of it, the members of the sentence would be detached, and this would be signified by the inflexions of the voice. Thus, the following two lines,

"Preserve the quick humanity it gives,

The pitying social sense of human weakness ;"

Would not be viewed as a *concession*, but rather as an *amplification* of the words which they follow : viz.

"Remember well

The noble lessons by affliction taught :"

And the succeeding clause,

"Yet keep thy generous fortitude entire,"

Would not signify an *assertion* ; it would be merely an *addition*, or *correction*. The concluding two lines, assume the office of explaining the amplification and correction ; i. e. the lines which they immediately follow. This method of reading the passage is altogether colloquial, and very unlike that which has been before explained. And though the procedure of thought is different, yet it may easily be perceived, that the sum total of thought or meaning in either, is the same. Now let it be asked, what word or *individual* expression could be adopted to correspond with this varied procedure of

thought and intellect? It is plain that the most simple sentence, whether it be affirmative or negative, cannot be formed without a sign, either expressed or understood, to signify the life and being of the substantive. "*The sun shines.*" Though the assertion in this sentence were to be denied, the process, as far as relates to the signifying of the life and being of the substantive, is the same. *The sun shines not.* If the part of speech *shines* be omitted, and the negation be immediately annexed to the substantive, viz. "*The sun not,*" and this be called a sentence, the meaning would not be the direct contrary of that in the former sentence, viz. *The sun shines*, but according to the Hebrew idiom, it would be reduced to—*The sun is not*—the simple, or primitive sign of affirmation, *is*, being understood. In the first instance of language, the primitive part of speech, the substantive, was, doubtless, a virtual sentence; the verb, or life of the substantive, being implied by gesticulation. The most simple sentence which can be devised, as expressive of the most elementary thought or proposition, must be composed, therefore, of at least two signs or parts of speech; that is to say, the substantive and the verb, one of them expressed, and the other either expressed or understood: it follows, that as ONE WORD or *individual sign*, having no relation to another word or sign understood, is insufficient for the purpose of communicating the most elementary thought or proposition; so ONE WORD or *individual sign* cannot be sufficient for the purpose of communicating the varied procedure of thought and intellect, as employed in logical and rhetorical science, and as exhibited in the construction of almost every sentence composed of alphabetic

words. Here the present point of discussion ends, and with it I transcribe the language of Dr. Blair :

“ Did men always think clearly,” says this author, “ and were they, at the same time, fully masters of the language in which they write, they would then, of course, acquire all those properties of precision, unity, and strength, which are so much recommended. For we may rest assured, that whenever we express ourselves ill, there is, besides the mismanagement of language, for the most part, some mistake in our manner of conceiving the subject. Embarrassed, obscure, and feeble sentences are generally, if not always, the result of embarrassed, obscure, and feeble thought. Thought and language act and re-act upon each other mutually. Logic and rhetoric have here, as in many other cases, a strict connexion ; and he that has learning to arrange his sentences with accuracy and order, has learning at the same time, to think with accuracy and order.”

CHAP. X.

Question respecting the origin of language—was it invented by man, or was it revealed to him by his Creator?—atheistical philosophy—remarks of Johnson—Selkirk—Juan Fernandez—the young man caught in the woods of Hanover—in France—arguments drawn from these circumstances, and from Genesis, chap 2.—the knowledge and use of any language to be improved by an acquaintance with other languages—primitive language—the Scriptures afford the safest arguments respecting the transmission of it—writers on this subject not corresponding in their opinions—the claims of different nations—Arabians—Syrians—Ethiopians—Armenians and the Jews—etymology of names considered—the name of Babel—and the names which are assigned by Moses to eastern countries, &c.—proved by Mr. Maurice to be the very names by which they were anciently known over all the east.

THERE are questions yet remaining, which seem to be justly related to the topics already discussed, and which are closely connected with an inquiry concerning the nature and philosophy of language. It is interesting to know, by what means, in the first ages of the world, did man learn to speak? Was language invented by man, or was it revealed to him by his Creator? Next to these questions, in point of interest, is that respecting the primitive language;—Has the primitive language been transmitted to the latter ages, or is it extinct? In pursuing these topics, we shall be naturally led to a consideration of those circumstances which caused the changes and the diversity of tongues.

Respecting the origin of language, there can be but two opinions: either language must have been invented by man, or it must have been revealed to him by his Creator.

The ancient and modern professors of atheistical philosophy represent the faculty of articulate speech, or

language, as the mere *instinctive* expression of the wants and desires of a herd of associated savages, gradually invented for mutual convenience of communication, and established by mutual consent. * But our great lexicographer justly remarks, that "language must have come by inspiration: a thousand, nay million of *children*, could not invent a language; while the organs are pliable, there is not understanding enough to form a language; and by the time there is understanding enough, the organs are grown stiff." This is confirmed by experience. "Alexander Selkirk, when cast away on the desert island of Juan Fernandez, after some years' residence, almost lost the use of his native tongue. The young savage, called Peter, caught in the woods of Hanover several years ago, though soon tamed and reconciled to society, never could be taught to speak. And lately, the young savage of Aveyron, in France, though put under the care of the celebrated Sicard, master of the deaf and dumb school, has never yet been observed to utter an articulate sound, not even to express his most urgent wants."—*D'Oyly and Mant*.

But that language was revealed to man by his Creator, may be proved from two circumstances: 1st. Because the Sacred History relates, that man exercised the faculty of speech in his *solitary* state: and 2dly. Because the same history mentions, that after Eve was brought to Adam, he said, "Therefore shall a man leave his *father* and his *mother*, and shall cleave unto his wife: and they shall be one flesh;" which passage signifies not only that the language of Adam was revealed to him, but that it must have been more copious and perfect than

* *D'Oyly and Mant's Bible*.

what has been generally inferred. Now we know, from the instances of Selkirk, Peter the wild boy, and the young savage of France, the circumstances which have been recently named, that the solitary state is altogether unfavourable to language; indeed, as language is the medium of communication, we may safely conclude, that, in his solitary state, language is unnatural to man, and, therefore, must have been revealed to him: and as Adam from positive experience, that is, by "sensation and reflexion," could have known nothing of father and mother, although he spoke of them before the birth of Cain, and intimated that the ties of husband and wife would be greater than the affections of children and parents, it most unquestionably follows, that language was not only revealed to man by his Creator, but also, that, originally, it must have been more copious and perfect than is generally believed.

If this conclusion is accurate, it will, doubtless, be perceived, that it is productive of many interesting questions: all of which would require the superior abilities of the greatest metaphysicians of the day, to discuss and do ample justice to them. They do not, however, belong to the present inquiry; a circumstance exceedingly fortunate to the Writer of this Treatise.

That a more correct knowledge and use of any language, may, with greater facility, be accomplished by an acquaintance with other languages than without them; is a position invariably received by the grammarians of all enlightened nations: and the advantage which is to be derived in the study of English from an intimacy with the Greek and Latin in particular, would be more than equally obtained from an acquaintance with the primitive language of mankind, were it transmitted to us. But

respecting this transmission, the Scriptures, the only true sources whence information of this nature is to be derived, are altogether silent; and the opinions and conjectures of those who have directed their attention to the subject, do not, by any means, correspond with each other. A few remarks, therefore, in repetition of some of the popular arguments on this interesting topic, will assist in rendering the succeeding considerations more easily admissible, and altogether free from ambiguity.

The Arabians, the Syrians, the Ethiopians, the Armenians, and several other nations (as well as some Europeans) dispute, all in their turns, for their respective languages; but the Jews are the people who assert the antiquity and excellence of theirs, with the greatest warmth and vigour.* They maintain, that it was immediately invested by God; that he himself spoke it; for which reason it is called holy; that it is the only language understood by the angels, and wherein we can pray and be heard with effect; it is *that* wherein the blessed in heaven converse, and wherein every nation, at the general resurrection, shall speak. But waving these fabulous notions—some authors† have maintained, that the Hebrew tongue was the most ancient in the world, the very same which was spoken by Adam and Noah, and preserved in the family of Heber; who formed a society distinct from these, that had suffered in the confusion of *Babel*, and so transmitted it *pure* to their posterity. And for the confirmation of this, they produce the *names* and *etymologies* of certain persons and things, which have

* F. Simon's Critical History. Buxtorf de Ling. Hebr. Orig.—Stackhouse.

† Chrys. tom. 2. Homil. 30. Augustinus de Civit. Dei. Selden de Syned. lib. 12.

some kind of affinity, and which *Moses* himself derives from the Hebrew.

To obviate this argument, taken from the *etymology* of names, we may observe, that those which seem to agree best with the *Hebrew* tongue, are not so much proper names, which children received at their birth, to distinguish them from all other people, as they are *surnames*, which were bestowed upon them, for some particular event or accident that befel them; that by these, they were afterwards known to posterity, and so in process of time, they came to be looked upon as proper names. Thus Adam, for instance, is unquestionably no proper name. (*Le Clerc's Dissertations*.)—That Adam is not a proper name may be proved from the first two verses of the fifth chapter of Genesis:—"This is the book of the generations of Adam: in the day that God created man, in the likeness of God made he him. Male and female created he them, and blessed them, and called *their name Adam*, in the day when they were created." Adam, i. e. *man*; like *homo*, the common name in Latin to both sexes. Adam, therefore, is certainly not a proper name, but possibly, was only bestowed on the first man by way of preeminence; for the same reason as the Romans might call him *homo*, because he was formed *ex humo*; though no one will say that the casual circumstance of this *paronomasia* is any reason why the *Latin* should be the primitive language. The name of *Babel* itself, which the *Hebrew* text tells us was so called because God did there בבל *balal*, i. e. *confound* the language of all the earth, may, say the compilers of *Universal History*, vol. i. page 350, more naturally be derived from the *Syriac*, in which tongue *balbel* is to confound; and *boblo*, or *bobel*,

confusion.* This argument has been further enforced; from the significancy of the names of several animals in the *Hebrew* tongue, which are thought to have been imposed by *Adam*, because of some peculiar qualities in the animal to which they were given, correspondent to their respective roots. (*Bochart.*) But since the same may be as justly asserted of most other languages, as the *Hebrew*, it will conclude nothing. (*Universal History.*) Besides, say the compilers of *Universal History*, we are much deceived, if we imagine that the verbs were really the original roots of the *Hebrew* tongue: on the contrary, the greatest part of them, at least, were themselves, at first, derived from nouns, though they be now, for grammatical convenience, considered as the roots. Many examples might be given of the verb's being manifestly derived from, and posterior to the noun, in all the oriental tongues; so, in English, *dog*, *duck*, &c. were certainly first imposed as names, and afterwards used as verbs, to express actions proper to those creatures.† All that is to be inferred from the derivation of *names*, is this, that these words were, very probably, brought into the *Hebrew* language, but it does not therefore follow, that the *whole* Hebrew language descended from the same *spring* whence *they* were derived.‡ Further, the names which are assigned by *Moses* to eastern countries and cities, derived to them immediately from the patriarchs, their original founders, are for the most

* According to Rich and Beauchamp, the mount of Babel adjoining Della Valle's ruin, is called by the Arabs, *Majelibé*, or *Makloubé*, signifying overturned, as the eastern writers say Babel was by a tempest from heaven.—Vide *Maurice's Observations on the Ruins of Babylon.*

† *Universal History*, vol. 1.

‡ Grotius, Hustius, Stackhouse.

part, says the Rev. Mr. Maurice, the very names by which they were anciently known over all the east; many of them were afterwards translated, with little variation, by the Greeks, in their systems of geography.* But without the aid of learning, any man, says Bishop Watson, who can barely read his Bible, and has but heard of such people as the Assyrians, the Elamites, the Lydians, the Medes, the Ionians, the Thracians, will readily acknowledge, that they had Assur, and Elam, and Lud, and Madai, and Javan, and Tiras, grandsons of Noah, for their respective founders.† Moses has traced in one short chapter, (Gen. x.) continues Mr. Maurice, all the inhabitants of the earth, from the Caspian and Persian seas to the extreme Gades, to their original, and recorded at once the period and occasion of their dispersion. This fact, and the conclusions from it, remarks Bishop Tomline, which are thus incontrovertibly established by the newly-acquired knowledge of the Sanscreeet language, were contended for and strongly enforced by Bochart and Stillingfleet, who could only refer to oriental opinions and traditions, as they came to them through the medium of Grecian interpretation. To the late excellent and learned president of the Asiatic society, we are chiefly indebted for the light recently thrown from the East upon this important subject. Avowing himself to be attached to no system, and as much disposed to reject the Mosaic history, if it were proved to be erroneous, as to believe it if he found it confirmed by sound reasoning and satisfactory evidence, he engaged in those researches to which his talents and situation were equally adapted: and the result of his

* Maurice's History of Hindostan, vol. 1.

† Apology for the Bible.—Bishop Watson.

laborious inquiries into the chronology, history, mythology, and languages of the nations, whence infidels have long derived their most formidable objections, was a full conviction, that neither accident nor ingenuity could account for the very numerous instances of similar traditions, and of near coincidence in the names of persons and places which are to be found in the Bible, and in ancient monuments of eastern literature.* Whoever, indeed, is acquainted with the writings of Mr. Bryant and Mr. Maurice, and with the Asiatic Researches, published at Calcutta, cannot but have observed, remarks Bishop Tomline, that the accounts of the creation, the fall, the deluge and dispersion† of mankind, recorded by the nations upon the east continent of Asia, bear a strong resemblance to each other, and to the narrative in the sacred history, and evidently contain the fragments of one original truth, which was broken by the dispersion of the patriarchal families, and corrupted by length of time, allegory, and idolatry. From this universal concurrence on this head, one of these things is necessarily true; either that all these traditions must have been taken from the author of the book of

* Asiatic Researches and Maurice's History.

† The following curious and valuable commentary on the tenth chapter of Genesis, which records the primitive settlements of the three families, is furnished by Abulfaragi, in his History of the Dynasties:—"In the 140th Phaleg, the earth was divided, by a second division among the sons of Noah. To the sons of Shem was allotted the middle of the earth, namely, Palestine, Syria, Assyria, Samarra, (a town of Babylonian or Chaldean Irac), Babel, Persia, and Hegiaz (or Arabian Petrea). To the sons of Ham—Teman, (or Idumea, Gen. 49th chapter, 7th verse), Africa, Nigritia, Egypt, Nubia, Ethiopia, Scindia, and India, (or western and eastern India), on both sides of the Indus. To the sons of Japheth, also, Garbia, (the North), Spain, France, the countries of the Greeks, Sclavonians, Bulgarians, Turks, and Armenians."—*Dr. Hales.*

Genesis, who made up his history from some or all such traditions as were already extant; or lastly, that he received his knowledge of past events by revelation. Were then all these traditions taken from the Mosaic history? It has been shown by Sir William Jones and Mr. Maurice, that they were received too generally and too early to make this supposition even possible; for they existed in different parts of the world in the very age when Moses lived. Was the Mosaic history composed from the traditions then existing? It is certain that the Chaldeans, the Persians, the most ancient inhabitants of India, and the Egyptians, all possessed the same story; but they had, by the time of Moses, wrapt it up in their own mysteries, and disguised it by their own fanciful conceits.*

CHAP. XI.

No notice in the sacred records respecting the primitive tongue—arguments of various writers stated—probability that all the people of the earth journeyed and settled in the plains of Shinar—division of the people of all the earth—remark of Shuckford respecting the Babylonian and Hebrew language—answered by a passage in Jeremiah, &c.—alphabetic writing—writings of Job—language of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.

IT is no where stated in the sacred records, that the language of Adam has been preserved; neither, as we have already remarked, are the opinions of the learned on the subject found to agree. Some writers assert that the confusion of tongues at the building of the tower of Babel was only partial, and that the primitive language

* Bishop Tomline—Christian Theology, vol. 1.

has been transmitted to the posterity of Eber, or Heber.* Other writers, in agreement with this opinion, affirm, that the building of Babel was commenced by the worst part of mankind; that they who had departed from the piety of their ancestors, were the only people who engaged in the undertaking.—In support of this doctrine it is asserted, that only part of the posterity of Noah journeyed from the East; but, in contradiction to it, other writers maintain that all the people of the earth journeyed thither and settled in the plains of Shinar. The high probability concerning the truth of this latter opinion will presently appear. Josephus says that Nimrod was the projector of the design of building Babel; while Bochart asserts, with as much confidence, that when the project of building the tower was formed, Nimrod must have been either very young or even not born. The late learned and indefatigable Sir William Jones was of

* From *Eber* (Gen. x. 21) Abram is called a Hebrew, Gen. chap. xiv. 13, and his posterity Hebrews, Gen. xxxix. 14; Exod. i. 15, 16. Some, however, have thought that Eber, in Gen. x. 21, is not a proper name: and Abraham is called a Hebrew, not from Eber, as the proper name of a man, but as this word imports one who comes from *beyond* the river Euphrates: And then, what we render “the children of Eber,” imports the inhabitants beyond the river Euphrates.—*Bishop Kidder*.

By *Eber* (Numbers xxiv. 24) is meant, either the people bordering on the Euphrates; or the Hebrews, the posterity of Eber. If the former; they, as well as the Assyrians, were subdued both by the Greeks and Romans; if the latter, which is most probable, they were afflicted, though not much by Alexander himself, yet by his successors the Seleucidæ, and particularly by Antiochus Epiphanes, who spoiled Jerusalem, defiled the temple, and slew all those who adhered to the law of Moses. Mac. i. 1.

They were worse afflicted by the Romans, who not only subdued and oppressed them, and made their country a province of the empire, but at last took away their place and nation, and sold and dispersed them over the face of the earth.—*Bishop Newton*.

opinion, that the primitive language of mankind is extinct.

It is very important to the subject of our inquiry to ascertain, whether *all* the people of the earth journeyed from the East and settled in the plains of Shinar, or only *part* of them.* On this point the sacred text appears to be perfectly decisive. "And the whole earth was of one language (or lip), and of one speech. And it came to pass as they journeyed from the East† that they found a

* "After a certain time," says Bishop Tomline, "the *whole race of men* moved from their original habitations in Armenia, and settled in the plains of Shinar near the Euphrates, in Assyria or Chaldea. Here they began to establish themselves, and began to build a city and town whose top might reach to heaven." In the two first editions of the "Elements of Christian Theology," Bishop Tomline stated that a *part only* of the inhabitants of the earth "journeyed from the east" and settled in the plains of Shinar; "but from a more attentive consideration of the subject, to which," says the Bishop, "I have been led by the learned and ingenious 'Remarks on the Eastern Origination of Mankind,' by Mr. Granville Penn, published in the second volume of the Eastern Collections, I have been induced to change my opinion."—Vide Christian Theology, 9th edition, vol. 1, page 139.

† By the east, most persons understand Armenia, where they suppose the ark rested, and Noah and his sons first planted themselves; but this has a great difficulty in it; for the mountains in Armenia lay north of Shinar or Assyria, and not east. To solve this, Bochart imagines, that Moses, in this place, has followed the geographical style of the Assyrians, who called all that lay beyond the Tigris, the east country, though a great part of it, towards Armenia, was really northward; and all that lay on this side, they called the west, though some of it certainly lay south. (Vide Phaleg, lib. 1.) But there is no need of this solution: (vide Stackhouse's *Body of Divinity*.) For though the Gordyeen mountains (whereon the ark probably rested) lie in a manner north of Babel, yet since the plain or valley of Shinar extends itself quite up to the mountains of Armenia; no sooner was Noah and his family descended from these Gordyeen mountains into the level country on the south, but they were very full east of the upper, or northern parts of the land of Shinar: so that it might truly and in the most literal sense be said, *that as* they journeyed from the east, they found a plain in the land of Shinar. (*Wells's Geography*.) This, however, has not hindered some from carrying the ark as far as mount Caucasus before

plain in the land of Shinar, and they dwelt there. And they said one to another, go to, let us make brick, and burn them thoroughly. And they had brick for stone, and slime had they for mortar. And they said go to, let us build us a city, and a tower, whose top may reach unto heaven, and let us make us a name, lest we be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth. And the Lord came down to see the city, and the tower which the children of men builded. And the Lord said, Behold, the *people is one*, and *they have all one language*: and this they begin to do; and now nothing will be restrained from them which they have imagined to do. Go to, let us go down, and there confound their language, that they may not understand one another's speech. So the Lord scattered them abroad from thence, upon the *face of all the earth*: and they left off to build the city: therefore is the name of it called Babel (i. e. confusion) because the Lord did *there confound the language of all the earth*: and from thence did the Lord scatter them abroad upon the face of all the earth."

We perceive here, that the people was *one*, that the whole human race had *one language*; that to divide this union and scatter the people abroad upon the face of all the earth, their language (*the language of all the earth*) was confounded.

it settled, that the people might be said to *journey* from the *East* without all controversy: and because we hear no more of Noah in the sacred story, only that he died at such a term of years, they thence conclude, that he and his postdiluvian race settled at first in the *East*, and very likely in *China* itself, since the singularity of the Chinese language, and manner of writing, and the antiquity of their history, their polity, and acquaintance with the learned sciences, do plainly denote them to have been of a very ancient extraction.—*Sir Walter Raleigh's History; Whiston's Theory; and Stackhouse's Body of Divinity.*

Nothing, possibly, can more strongly impress upon our minds the use and power of language, than the confusion of tongues at the building of the city and tower of Babel: it proves the absolute necessity of precision in the use of terms of art or science. And when their language was confounded, "They left off to build the city."

But whether the opinion of Bochart respecting Nimrod, or that of Josephus be preferred, it is no where attested in the sacred writings, that the primitive language was transmitted to the sons of Eber; on the contrary, it is expressly said of the children of Shem, in common with those of Ham and Japheth, that the earth was divided in the days of *Peleg*, (i. e. *division*,* *separation*), "after their families after their tongues, in their lands, after their nations:" and it is also sufficiently attested in the same writings, that the family and posterity of Eber, who continued on the other side of the Euphrates, spoke the old Chaldean tongue: and, moreover, that Abraham, after he had lived seventy-five years in Ur of the Chaldees, went "as the Lord had spoken unto him," and dwelt in another land. It has, therefore, been conjectured, that this Chaldean, or the ancient Syriac, and the old Hebrew, were the very same language; which some seem to think is the most ancient language† which has descended to us: but it is presumed that this does not refer to the Hebrew of the Bible. In this part of our inquiry the remark of the Rev. Mr. Maurice is exceedingly useful: the Chaldea from which Abraham mi-

* The great dispersion, recorded in Gen. xi. happening just when *Peleg* was born, made his father call him by this name, which signifies division and separation.—*Bishop Patrick*.

† Sir William Jones has endeavoured to prove from etymology, that the Persian was the most ancient language which has descended to us.

grated "was in or near Armenia, and must not be confounded with the country afterwards called Chaldea, the capital of which was Babylon." That the languages of these two Chaldean countries, at the time of the dispersion, were different from each other, there can be but little doubt. This opinion is not affected by the remark of Dr. Shuckford, that the Babylonian and Hebrew were originally the very same language; 1st. Because we read in Jeremiah v. 15—"Lo I will bring a nation (*Babylon**) upon you from far, O house of Israel, saith the Lord; it is a mighty nation, it is an ancient nation, a nation whose *language* thou *knowest not*, neither understandest what they say:" and 2dly. Because Ur of the Chaldees was the country of part of the posterity of Shem; and Babylon, of part of the posterity of Ham; and the nations of all the earth were divided and dispersed after their *families* and after their TONGUES. How long these precise differences lasted it is impossible to say: we may, however, easily imagine, that until the practice of alphabetical writing was universal, each individual language would be liable to alteration; and this especially refers to the languages of those countries, where the Hebrews and Israelites sojourned, and where, after the Egyptian bondage, the Jews settled. But the question respecting the first instance of alphabetical writing is attended with even more and greater difficulties than that of language itself. Doubtless, both derived their origin from the same source; and it is pretty clear, that *unassisted* reason could have invented neither. The almost infinite changes and varieties, which the Divine art of alphabetic writing is capable of producing,

* Babylon was built about a hundred years after the flood: and soon after Nimrod erected a kingdom there: whence that country is called "The land of Nimrod." Mic. v. 6.—W. LOWTH;

almost confirm us in the opinion, that man received it immediately from his Maker.

The first time that alphabetical writing is mentioned in the Pentateuch is in Exodus xvii. 14. "And the Lord said write this as a memorial in a book, and rehearse it in the ears of Joshua."—According to the chronology of Dr. Lloyd, this was pronounced to Moses, three months prior to the promulgation of the law on Mount Sinai. But it is generally admitted by sacred critics, that the writings of Job were anterior to this event, and likewise to the books of the Pentateuch, and, consequently, that these are the most ancient records in the world.* This circumstance, says Dr. Hales, (*D'Oyly*

* Homer is the most ancient of the profane writers: and, according to the opinion of the late Dr. Hill, of St. Andrew's, in his *Essays on Ancient Greece*, the age in which he lived was about 1200 years before the Christian era; according to the calculation of Sir Isaac Newton, it was 900 years before the Christian era: but as the poet has made no allusion to the return of the Heracleidæ, which happened 80 years after the taking of Troy, (1270 before the Christian era), the conclusion of Dr. Hill appears to be well grounded. It is well authenticated that the Greeks acknowledged to have received their letters from the Phœnicians.. (*Herodotus, Terpsichore*). "Ἴωνες παραλαβόντες διδασχὴν παρὰ τῶν Φοινίκων τὰ γράμματα, et seq. Iones, cum à Phœnicibus literas didicissent, usi eis sunt cum immutatione quâdam; et cum usu professi sunt (ut æquum erat, cum eas Phœnices in Græciam attulissent) quodd litteræ illæ Phœnicis dicebantur. Eupolemus, in his book on the kings of Judea, says, Mosem primum fuisse sapientum, atque ab eo datam literaturam Judæis, quæ ab Judæis, ad Phœnices pervenerit. (*Grotius*). Capel, Bochart, and Le Clerc have proved that the shape of the letters of the Greeks was the same as that of the Phœnician and Samaritan letters. The Cadmean alphabet consisted of 16 letters, to which Palamedes added four, and Simonides of Melos four others. "The command that every king, upon his accession to the throne, should write him a copy of the law in a book out of that which is before the priests," Deut. v. 18, is a proof not only that the law existed in writing, but that there was a copy of it deposited in the tabernacle, or temple.—*Bishop Tomline*.

We have the authority of tradition to say that every tribe was furnished with a copy of the laws before the death of Moses.—*Ibid*.

and *Mant's Bible*), stamps the highest value upon the Book of Job, as a most faithful and authentic monument of the language, the learning, the manners, and the religion of the earlier and purer patriarchal ages.

Doubtless, on his arrival at Canaan, Abraham retained for some time his original tongue; but after his return from Egypt, the long stay which he made in Canaan, the possessions he acquired, the alliances he contracted, the covenants he made, and the credit and conversation he had with the people of the country, make it more than probable, that he acquired the Canaanitish or Phœnician language, and transmitted it to Isaac. Other learned men conceive, therefore, that it is no unreasonable conjecture, that the language of Isaac and Jacob, instead of being the parent of all, was itself descended from that of Canaan. It is acknowledged that this conclusion will not be diminished by the circumstances of Isaac* and Jacob's journeying for their

* Gen. xxv. 20. "And Isaac was forty years old when he took Rebekah to wife, the daughter of Bethuel, the Syrian, of Padan-Aram, the sister to Laban, the Syrian." Bethuel, as also his son Laban, is called the Aramite, or Syrian, not as descended from Aram, or a Syrian by descent; but as living in the country which fell to the lot of Aram at the first plantation after the flood, (or rather at the general dispersion of mankind), and which must accordingly be esteemed a part also of Syria, largely taken to denote all the country of Aram. For he lived at Haran, and so in the north part of Aram-Naharaim, or Mesopotamia, which north part, from the fruitfulness of it, was particularly called Padan-Aram, the word *Padan* denoting a cultivated fruitful ground.—*Dr. Wells.*

The Syrians were so called, because they were the descendents of Aram, the son of Shem. Gen. x. 22. *Aram-Naharaim*, was the country of those Syrians that lived between the two rivers Tigris and Euphrates. (*Bishop Patrick.*) *Ashur* properly means the descendants of Asshur, the Assyrian; but the Syrians and Assyrians are often confounded together, and mentioned as the same people. The Greeks under Alexander the Great subdued all those countries. The Romans afterwards extended their empire into the same regions: and Assyria, properly so called, was conquered by the emperor Trajan.—*Bp. Newton.*

wives to the East, to the paternal country of Abraham, Padan-Aram, near Ur of the Chaldees; for while it is admitted, that Abraham had acquired the language of Canaan, it does not follow, that he had either forgotten his native tongue, or that he had not, in some degree, transmitted it to Isaac, and that Isaac had not transmitted it to Jacob. Still it is not improbable, that, during the twenty years' stay of Jacob in his father-in-law Laban's house, he spoke the language of the place; and became as much familiar with that as with the language of Canaan: it seems very probable, I think, that he should have cultivated a further knowledge and practice of the language of this country; the country of his betrothed wife, the country where his heart was glad, where "seven years were as a few days." It is here to be recollected, that this was the birth-place of the twelve sons of Jacob: the original language of the Israelites was the same, therefore, or nearly the same, as that of Abraham.

But whether we yield to, or depart altogether from the opinion of Le Clerc and Stackhouse, that "The Hebrew tongue, instead of being the parent of all, was itself descended from that of Canaan," no doubt can possibly arise in our minds respecting the change or modification of the language of the Hebrews and Israelites during the period of 215 years, from the departure of Abraham out of the country of Ur of the Chaldees. This circumstance is, in some degree, corroborated by the passages in Gen. xxxi. 45, &c. respecting the covenant which was made between Laban and Jacob—"And Jacob took a stone, and set it up for a pillar. And Jacob said unto his brethren, gather stones; and they took stones, and made an heap, and they did eat there.

upon the heap. And Laban called it *Jegar-saha dutha*: but Jacob called it *Galeed*, (the one is a Syriac, the other a Hebrew name: both having the same signification;" (*Bishop Patrick*;) that is, according to the marginal reference of the Bible, "the heap of witness." "Therefore was the name of it called Galeed (a heap), and Mizpah, (a beacon, or watch tower; *marginal reference*). It is, nevertheless, to be recollected, that the journey of Jacob to Padan-Aram, and his twenty years' stay there, tended very much to restore to him the original language of his grandfather, Abraham; but as alphabetical writing was not then invented, it is natural to conceive, that in proportion to the various relations of time, circumstance, and place, the language of the children of Israel, though a separate people, would be perpetually fluctuating.

CHAP. XII.

Causes of the fluctuation of language stated—language of the Israelites neither spoken nor generally understood in Egypt at the time of the famine—the marriages of Joseph and Moses with Egyptian women—the friendship which possibly subsisted between the Israelites and the Egyptians until the death of Joseph—the mixed multitude which departed from Egypt—the language in which the written law was promulgated on Mount Sinai different from the language of the original or former sons of Eber—from the time of the captivity the Hebrew ceased to be a living language.

LINGUISTS admit very generally that a living language is liable to various modifications; this is affirmed to be true even when the language has been spoken in its greatest purity, and protected by the efforts of classical writers: and we very well know that time, circumstance, and place, do occasion alterations—in all modern

languages. The propriety of consenting to this position will be felt by referring to the 12th chapter of Judges, the 5th and 6th verses, respecting the pronunciation of the sons of Ephraim. "And the Gileadites took the passages of Jordan before the Ephraimites: and it was so that when those Ephraimites which were escaped, said, let me go over, that the men of Gilead said unto him, art thou an Ephraimite? if he said, nay; then said they unto him, say now Shibboleth: and he said *Sibboleth*: for he could not frame to pronounce it right." And certainly what is applicable to a written language, as the Hebrew, at the time when the Ephraimites quarrelled with Jephtha, must be equally so to a language which was not a written one,—as that of the Hebrews and Israelites, before their deliverance from the Egyptian bondage.

On these points, however, the sacred records are entirely silent: hence all the opinions respecting them must be governed entirely by analogy. But one circumstance is well authenticated; and that is this;—the language of the children of Israel at the time of the famine in and about Egypt and Canaan, was not spoken or generally understood in Egypt. For when the children of Israel went there to buy corn, and appeared before Joseph, he "knew them, but made himself strange:" that is, he affected not to know them, but conversed with them by an interpreter. "If ye be true men, let one of your brethren be bound in the house of our prison: go ye, carry corn for the famine of your houses. But bring your youngest brother unto me, so shall your words be verified, and ye shall not die."—"And they said one to another, We are very guilty concerning our brother, in that we saw the anguish of

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his soul, when he besought us; and we would not hear; therefore is this distress come upon us. And Reuben answered and said, spake I not unto you, saying, Do not sin against the child, and ye would not hear? therefore behold, also, his blood is required." And then follows, "They knew not that Joseph understood them: for he spake unto them by an interpreter." Gen. xiii. 19 to 23. Compare Psalm lxxxi. 5. cxiv. 5.—The two-and-twenty years' residence, preparatory to this event, afforded Joseph ample time to be completely conversant and familiar with the Egyptian language: the acquirement of which was to him doubtless a matter of necessity: he was an utter stranger in the land; and, according to our annotators, his first office was of menial employ; but the Lord was with Joseph; and his master, seeing that the Lord was with him, made him overseer over all his house; "And all that he had he put into his hand." The wickedness and fury of a voluptuous and disappointed woman were the occasion of the sudden dismissal of Joseph, and of his being cast into prison.—And here we are required to adore the inscrutable ways of Providence: for, notwithstanding the most unpromising appearances which present themselves, and means, which, to us, seem oftentimes the most unfavourable, ends frequently are produced of the utmost, vital consequence. Such exactly was the instance of the affliction of Joseph, of his being sold into Egypt, and finally cast into prison. The truth of this is confirmed from the results which followed; and which were occasioned by the power that enabled him to interpret the dreams of the two men in the prison; and, finally, that of Pharoah, which none of the magicians nor wise men could explain. "And Pharoah said unto Joseph,

“Forasmuch as God hath shewed thee all this, there is none so discreet and wise as thou art: thou shalt be over my house, and, according unto thy word, shall all my people be ruled: only in the throne will I be greater than thou. And he gave him to wife Asenath, the daughter of Potiphorah the priest, (or *prince*,) of On.—And unto Joseph were born two sons before the years of famine came; and he called the name of the first-born Menasseh, (that is, forgetting,) for God, said he, hath made me forget all my toil, and all my father’s house. And the name of the second called he Ephraim, (that is, fruitful,) for God hath caused me to be fruitful in the land of my affliction.” Gen. xli.—From this it may be safely inferred, I think, that the seeds of the Egyptian language were likely to be sown in the soil of that of the Israelites. The rank to which Joseph was raised, and the alliance which he had formed with the daughter of Potiphorah, the Egyptian prince, would naturally cause the language of Egypt to spread and identify itself, in some respects, with the language of the Israelites. It was, moreover, the native language of the tribes of Manasseh and Ephraim; and, possibly, was spoken by them and their respective families in an uncorrupted state for 76 years. And what is true of the language of the sons and grandsons of Manasseh, and “Ephraim’s children of the third generation,” is equally true of Moses and his generation. Moses was instructed in all the wisdom of the Egyptians; Acts vii. 22.; his very name was derived from the Egyptian language; for, according to Bryant and Calmet, *Mo*, or *Mou*, was the Egyptian for water. “Moses fled from the face of Pharoah, and dwelt in the land of Midian:”—a part of Arabia Pitrea, where some of Abraham’s posterity, the

sons of his concubines, were settled, whom he separated from Isaac while he lived. "Now the priest or prince of Midian had seven daughters, and they came and drew water, and filled the troughs to water their father's flock. And the shepherds came and drove them away: but Moses stood up and helped them, and watered their flock. And when they came to Reuel, their father, he said, how is it that you are come so soon to day? And they said, an EGYPTIAN delivered us out of the hands of the shepherds, and also drew water enough for us, and watered the flock. And he said unto his daughters, and where is he? why is it that ye have left the man? Call him that he may eat bread. And Moses was content to dwell with the man, and he gave Moses Zepporah, his daughter. And she bare him a son, and he called his name *Gershon*: for he said I have been a stranger in a strange land." Exodus ii. 15, &c.

It may be made a standing observation, says Stackhouse, that the sacred authors do not relate all the particulars of a story, as other authors delight to do, but such only as are most material. We may, therefore, suppose, that a great many things intervened between Moses's entrance into Jero's* family, and his marriage to the daughter of Jero: especially, considering that his children were so young at his return into Egypt, after an absence of forty years.† According to Bryant, this

* The name of the priest of Midian was Jero; so that either Reuel was his name as well as Jero, or else Reuel was the father of Jero, and therefore grandfather of these young women.—*Bishop Patrick*.

It is usual in Scripture to call the grandfather, father; see Gen. xxiv. 48, where Rebekah is called Abraham's brother's daughter; she was in fact his grand-daughter.—*Bishop Kidder*—*D'Oyly and Munt's Bible*.

† Stackhouse.

marriage of Moses was contrary to the usage of his forefathers, and of the Hebrews in general: and it seemed to intimate that he thought himself quite alienated from his countrymen: but the writer appears to have forgotten the case of Joseph's marriage with the daughter of Potiphorah, the Egyptian prince, when Joseph forgot all his toil and all his father's house. These marriages, as far as the point in question is concerned, tended, no doubt, to modify and corrupt the language of those descended through Isaac, from the line of Eber: which number, independently of Jacob, Joseph, and his two sons, and Moses, was only three score and six; and before they departed out of Egypt increased to 600,000, inclusive of the mixed multitude which went with them.

On their arrival in Egypt, the Israelites were allowed to dwell in Goshen, and the most active of them were permitted to be rulers of the cattle of Pharaoh. They were exceedingly prone to mix, and imitate the manners of the people, in whatsoever country they sojourned. This may be gathered from their history.

At the end of 124 years after their arrival in Egypt, it brought down upon them the vengeance of Almighty God; when a new king arose, who knew not Joseph, nor the acts which he had performed in Egypt; when taskmasters were placed over the Israelites, and they were afflicted with heavy burdens. Thus, having suffered hard bondage 91 years (which, with the 124 years from the death of Jacob, and 215 from the coming of Abraham out of his native country, make up the 430 mentioned) 600,000 of the Israelites departed on foot out of Egypt: "and a mixed multitude went also with them." That is, as Bishop Patrick explains the passage,

there were others besides Israelites; perhaps, they were proselytes, who had renounced idolatry: or they were persons with whom the Israelites were connected by intermarriages. The meaning contained in the last clause seems to be corroborated by the interpretation of Josephus, and approved of by Dr. Shuckford in the passage—"every woman" of the Israelites "shall borrow," or rather according to the Hebrew, *ask*, (ask of any to give.—*Harmer, Shuckford*) "of her neighbours." The Egyptians made the Hebrews considerable presents: and some did so in order to induce them to go the sooner away from them: others out of respect to, and on account of the acquaintance they had with them. That there was something like mutual sympathy and friendship during one part of the history of the Israelites and Egyptians, may be evidenced in the singular magnificence of the funeral of Jacob. "And Pharaoh said, go up, and bring thy father, according as he made thee swear. And Joseph went up to bury his father: and with him went up all the servants of Pharaoh, the elders of his house, and all the elders of the land of Egypt. And all the house of Joseph, and his brethren, and his father's house: only their little ones, and their flocks, and their herds, they left in the land of Goshen. And there went up with him both chariots and horsemen: and it was a very great company. And they came to the threshing floor of *Atad*, which is beyond Jordan, and there they mourned with a very great and sore lamentation: and he made a mourning for his father seven days. And when the inhabitants of the land, the *Canaanites*, saw the mourning in the floor of *Atad*, they said, this is a grievous mourning to the *Egyptians*; wherefore the name of it was called *Abel Mizraim*:"

that is (according to the margin of the Bible) the *mourning* of the *Egyptians*. Thus, like Moses in the land of Media, the people of Canaan seem to have identified the Israelites with the Egyptians. For splendour and magnificence, Stackhouse conceived this funeral to be without parallel in history. Perhaps, the noble obsequies of Marcellus approach the nearest to it. But how do even these fall short of the simple narrative before us. For what were the six hundred beds for which the Roman solemnities on this occasion were so famous; when compared to that national itinerant multitude, which swelled like a flood and moved like a river; to "all Pharaoh's servants, to the elders of the house, and all the elders of the land of Egypt," that is, to the officers of his household, and deputies of his provinces; with all the house of Jacob; and "his brethren, and father's house," conducting their solemn sorrow for near two hundred miles into a distant country.*

The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion, will receive support from the arguments which are advanced by Le Clerc to prove that Grotius is correct in his remark, that the most ancient attic laws, whence the Roman laws afterwards were taken, derived their origin from those of Moses: *Leges Atticæ consentaneæ sunt in multis Hebraicis, quod Attici multas consuetudines Cecropi Ægyptio deberent; quodque apud Hebræos Deus multas Ægyptiorum institutis, quibus Hebræi aduerti erant, similes leges tulerit, iis tamen emendatis quæ noxia esse poterant.*† A still stronger evidence than this, that the Israelites and Egyptians were influenced by the manners and conduct of each other, may

* Stackhouse's Body of Divinity.

† Clericus.

be gathered from the notes of Grotius himself, as well as by those of Le Clerc respecting the remarks of Herodotus, Diodorus, Strabo, Philo Biblius, concerning the ancient rite of circumcision.—The Egyptians, says Bp. Patrick, borrowed circumcision either from the Hebrews or the Ishmaelites, or some other people descended from Abraham. The Jews, says Strabo, liber xvii. p. 824, are far from confessing that they derived this custom from the Egyptians; on the contrary, they openly declare that the Egyptians learned to be circumcised of Joseph.

Now it must appear exceedingly plain to any one moderately attending to these historical facts and inferences, that the original language of Abraham must have undergone very considerable alterations prior to the departure of the Israelites out of Egypt, and of their becoming more peculiarly a separate and distinct people. The circumstance of *all the people of the earth journeying from the East and settling in the plains of Shinar, therefore—the occurrences and results of the journey of Abraham into the land of Canaan—of the history of Joseph and his marriage with an Egyptian princess—of the tribes of Manasseh and Ephraim, who probably married Egyptian women—of the friendship which possibly subsisted between the Israelites and the Egyptians until the death of Joseph—of the history of Moses and his Egyptian learning, his marriage with a princess of Media—of the mixed multitude which departed from Egypt, and of other incidents that might be enumerated,—all these circumstances, and the results of all these relations and particulars, during a period of 430 years, when alphabetical writing was unknown, or if known, it must have been only in a very small degree, known, perhaps only to Moses, who, according to Dr. Magee, probably read*

the Book of Job to the Israelites under the Egyptian bondage, to teach them the great duty of submission to the will of God,—I say all these circumstances must surely have occasioned various modifications and alterations in the language of the posterity of Abraham, prior to the promulgation of the written law as set forth in the ancient copies of the Bible.

These are some of the arguments which prove that the original language of mankind has not, through the Hebrews, been transmitted to us. The language in which the Pentateuch was originally written, was, doubtless, the common language of the Israelites, at the time when they were conducted into the wilderness of Sinai; and the language of the Pentateuch was as likely the same as that in which the Lord declared unto them his covenant on Mount Sinai. “And when the voice of the trumpet sounded long and waxed louder, Moses spake, and God answered by a voice;” Exodus xix. 19. “These words the Lord spake unto all your assembly in the mount, out of the midst of the fire, of the cloud, and of the thick darkness, with a great voice, and he added no more, and he wrote them on two tablets of stone, and delivered them unto you. And it came to pass when ye heard the voice out of the midst of the darkness (for the mountain did burn with fire) that ye came over unto me, even all the heads of your tribes, and your elders. And ye said, behold the Lord our God hath shewed us his glory, and his greatness, and we have heard his voice out of the midst of the fire: we have seen this day that God doth talk with man, and he liveth.” Deut. v. 22, 3, 4.

The ceremonial and civil laws were intermixed with each other, and, by divine appointment, were instituted

for the very purpose of separating the Israelites from the idolatrous Canaanites, and estranging them from all other customs of the heathens: on this account, and on this alone, they were esteemed a holy and peculiar people with God. "And ye shall be holy unto me; for I, the Lord, am holy, and have severed you from other people; that ye should be mine."—The conclusion to be drawn from the whole of these arguments, is, that the language of the Israelites on their being delivered out of Egypt; or the language in which the written law was promulgated on Mount Sinai, was different from the old Syrian or Chaldean language, and also different from the language of the original or former sons of Eber. This statement exactly corresponds with the subsequent histories of the Bible, and particularly with the history of king Hezekiah, 2 Kings, chap. xviii. 26; Is. xxxvi. 2; and also in the 5th chapter of Jeremiah, 15th verse; 1st chapter of Daniel, 4th verse; and 2d chapter, and 4th verse;—whereas, in all of which passages, it appears, that the Syrian language was unknown to the Jews.* "The Aramean or Syrian language,† as understood in its largest sense, is what was spoken by the Assyrians, Babylonians, and many of the neighbouring nations, and the same with what was called the ancient Chaldee. This language, when corrupted by the introduction of many Hebrew words, is called the Hebrew tongue in the *New Testament*. The language spoken in Antioch and other parts of Syria, differs as a dialect from the

* If this Syrian were the language of Eber, it is presumed that it was not unknown to Abraham.

† But possibly this Syrian language is a union, or nearly so, of the dialects of Ur of the Chaldees, and the other Chaldea, the capital of which was Babylon.

former, and is what we now call the Syriac." (*Wintle ; W. Lowth ; D'Oyly and Mant's Bible ;* Dan. chap. ii. 4.) From the period when the written law was given to the Israelites, down to the time of the Babylonish captivity, it is universally allowed that the Hebrew language underwent very little alteration ; at least as little alteration as was effected in the Greek language from the time of Hesiod and Homer to that of Longinus, occupying a space of 1200 years. It is, however, shewn by Bishop Marsh, that there is just difference enough in the various books of the Bible to shew, that its authenticity is secure. "It is certain," says he, "that the five books which are ascribed to Moses, were not written in the time of David, the Psalms of David in the age of Isaiah, nor the prophecies of Isaiah in the time of Malachi. (*Marsh on the authenticity of the five Books of Moses.*)—It is generally admitted, that, at the time of the Babylonish captivity, the Hebrew gradually ceased to be a living language, and that the anomalous jargon in which modern Jews converse with each other, is very far removed from the Hebrew of the Bible.

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